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WHEN FOR BETTER IS FOR WORSE: 
IMMIGRATION LAW’S GENDERED IMPACT 
ON FOREIGN POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGE 
SARAH L. EICHENBERGER† 
ABSTRACT 
  The United States has banned polygamous immigrants since the 
late nineteenth century. Enacted amid isolationist fears that an influx 
of polygamists would cause moral deterioration, the polygamy bar 
remains a resolute, if often overlooked, feature of modern 
immigration law. The current immigration scheme continues this 
tradition, rendering immigrants who intend to practice polygamy in 
the United States categorically ineligible for legal-permanent-resident 
status. As a result, the immigration bar allows polygamous men to 
immigrate with a wife of their choosing and the children from each of 
their marriages. Their other wives, however, are deemed inadmissible 
to the United States. 
  This Note explores the immigration bar’s disproportionate effect 
on the foreign wives of polygamous immigrants. In addition to 
precluding the other wives of polygamous immigrants from legal-
permanent-resident status, the current immigration bar also renders 
such women ineligible for humanitarian ingress. After offering a 
comparative analysis of how Canada and the United Kingdom 
reconcile their respective policies against polygamy with the 
burgeoning question of women’s rights, this Note proposes that 
Congress likewise treat foreign women in polygamous unions with a 
degree of equity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On April 3, 2008, authorities raided the Mormon Fundamentalist 
Yearning for Zion Ranch. International news agencies captured 
footage of the ranch’s women and children who, wearing prairie-style 
dresses and shell-shocked expressions, appeared hauntingly out of 
place.1 Yet when a fire at a Bronx row house in March 2007 exposed 
Malian-born Moussa Magassa’s polygamous family, the story barely 
registered in the national consciousness.2 Instead, it was greeted with 
virtual silence. Perhaps Americans ignored Magassa’s story because it 
lacked the salacious innuendo: the alleged incest,3 child brides, and 
sexual abuse.4 Or perhaps it went unnoticed because polygamous 
immigrants, unlike their American counterparts, are better left out of 
sight and out of mind. 
Under current immigration law, immigrants who intend to 
practice polygamy in the United States are categorically inadmissible. 
Nevertheless, immigrants like Magassa are hardly unique. Indeed, as 
a 2007 article in The New York Times reported, the “clandestine 
practice . . . probably involves thousands of New Yorkers”5 because, 
for the immigrants who have been bequeathed polygamy as a cultural 
inheritance, plural marriage does not stop at the United States’ entry 
ports. Instead, as one Gambian woman remarked, “[W]hether 
[immigrant women] like it or not, [their husbands] will marry” 
additional wives.6 The wives of polygamous immigrants have no 
means of escaping their marriages, she observed, because “[i]f you 
 
 1. Andrew Gumbel, Zion Raid: The Ranch Has Not Yet Revealed All Its Secrets . . ., 
INDEPENDENT (London), Apr. 13, 2008, at A16. 
 2. The New York Times was the only national newspaper to carry Magassa’s story. See 
Nina Bernstein, Polygamy, Practiced in Secrecy, Follows Africans to New York, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 23, 2007, at A1. 
 3. Warren Jeffs, the former leader of the Yearning for Zion Ranch, was charged as an 
accomplice to “four counts of incest and sexual conduct with a minor stemming from two 
arranged marriages.” Texan Sect Girls ‘In Abuse Cycle,’ BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
americas/7339392.stm (last updated Apr. 9, 2008). In August 2011, Jeffs was convicted of child 
sexual assault. Polygamist Leader Convicted of Child Sex Abuse, NPR (Aug. 4, 2011), http://
www.npr.org/2011/08/04/139004476/polygamist-leader-convicted-of-child-sex-abuse (“A Texas 
jury has convicted polygamist leader Warren Jeffs of child sexual assault charges in a case 
stemming from two young followers he took as brides in what his church calls ‘spiritual 
marriages.’”). 
 4. See Sara Corbett, Children of God, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 27, 2008, at 36, 36 
(describing one of the minors removed from the Yearning for Zion Ranch as “a member of an 
out-of-touch religious sect” and “a possible child bride, or a sexual-abuse victim”). 
 5. Bernstein, supra note 2. 
 6. Id. 
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protest, your husband will hit you, and if you call the police . . . the 
whole community will scorn you.”7 State legal systems favor “[d]on’t-
ask-don’t-know policies” over intervention into immigrants’ 
polygamous marriages, relying on immigration laws to keep 
practicing polygamists from entering the country in the first place.8 
This approach places immigrant women who circumvent the 
immigration bar on uncertain ground, where their status is “murky at 
best”9 and “invisible” at worst.10 
This Note explores the polygamy bar’s disproportionate effect on 
foreign-born women in polygamous marriages.11 Polygamy is a deeply 
ingrained practice within some of the world’s most prominent 
religions.12 In the United States, however, polygamy did not become a 
widespread phenomenon until the nineteenth century, when 
Mormons adopted plural marriage as a tenet of their faith. 
Threatened by what they perceived as a deviant religion, critics of the 
Mormon Church seized on polygamy as a reason for marginalizing 
the emergent sect. Although the antipolygamy campaign was initially 
motivated by a desire to emancipate Mormon wives, the critics’ 
dialogue quickly morphed into a condemnation of Mormon women, 
whose apparent complicity in plural marriage was thought to merit 
punishment rather than sympathy. In response to the growing public 
outrage, Congress enacted legislation that curtailed Mormon 
women’s rights and, thus, tacitly endorsed the misogynistic rhetoric. 
Because modern immigration law preserves the last vestiges of the 
federal antipolygamy campaign, its gendered understanding of plural 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Barbara Bradley Hagerty, Some Muslims in U.S. Quietly Engage in Polygamy, NPR 
(May 27, 2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=90857818. 
 11. Although polygamy technically encompasses both polyandry—one woman marrying 
several men—and polygyny—one man marrying several women—this Note uses the term 
“polygamy” to denote only polygyny because polyandry is extremely rare. Shayna M. Sigman, 
Everything Lawyers Know About Polygamy Is Wrong, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 101, 161 
(2006). 
 12. An estimated 5.8 percent of Hindu marriages are polygamous, and an estimated 5.7 
percent of Muslim marriages are polygamous. SHAILLY SAHAI, SOCIAL LEGISLATION AND 
STATUS OF HINDU WOMEN 45 (1996). Polygamy, however, is not limited to the Islamic and 
Hindu faiths. In Cameroon, for example, where the native people practiced polygamy long 
before their conversion to Christianity, Cameroonites “develop[ed] a theory in which 
[polygamy] was part of ‘true’ Christianity.” Sigman, supra note 11, at 160 (quoting Catrien 
Notermans, True Christianity Without Dialogue: Women and the Polygyny Debate in Cameroon, 
97 ANTHROPOS 341, 346–47 (2002)). 
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marriage perpetuates the very discrimination that polygamy itself is 
accused of enabling.13 
This Note proceeds in five Parts. Part I estimates the incidence of 
polygamous marriage among recent U.S. immigrants. Part II traces 
the gender-motivated history of antipolygamy legislation in the 
United States. Part III examines how U.S. immigration laws 
disadvantage foreign women in polygamous marriages. Part IV 
analyzes the more equitable treatment of plural wives under the 
immigration laws of Canada and the United Kingdom. Finally, Part V 
argues that the United States should adopt the equitable model of its 
peer nations by waiving the polygamy bar in humanitarian situations 
and treating women in polygamous unions as putative spouses. This 
Note concludes that existing U.S. immigration laws seek to end 
polygamy among foreign immigrants the same way nineteenth-
century lawmakers sought to reform Mormonism: by divesting 
women in polygamous marriages of their rights. If female 
emancipation indeed remains the United States’ endgame, then 
Congress should adopt a more nuanced polygamy bar. 
I.  THE INCIDENCE OF POLYGAMOUS IMMIGRATION 
For two decades, Western democracies have grappled with the 
problem of polygamous immigrants.14 In the midst of this burgeoning 
international debate, the United States has remained conspicuously 
silent because, officially, it does not admit practicing polygamists.15 
The unofficial story, however, is different. According to the 
Department of Homeland Security 2010 Yearbook of Immigration 
Statistics, some of the United States’ largest immigrant populations 
come from countries in which polygamy is “lawful and widespread.”16 
 
 13. See Sigman, supra note 11, at 163 (indicating that polygamy is often perceived as a 
“gender biased monolith”). 
 14. For example, in the early 1990s, France enacted a law that forced polygamous 
immigrants to “de-cohabitate.” Bissuel Bertrand, Divorce, or Else . . ., 44 WORLD PRESS REV. 4, 
4 (2002). Several years after that development, the United Kingdom quietly extended welfare 
benefits to the wives of polygamous immigrants. See Susan Martinuk, Polygamous Marriages 
Drain Taxpayer Dollars, CALGARY HERALD (Feb. 15, 2008), http://www.canada.com/
calgaryherald/news/theeditorialpage/story.html?id=4584f9bc-04ce-4608-b740-72b422deef14 
(“[The British government] acted quietly and without public consultation in agreeing to pay 
polygamists subsidies for additional housing and to grant additional tax benefits.”). 
 15. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 212(a)(10)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(10)(A) 
(2006) (“Any immigrant who is coming to the United States to practice polygamy is 
inadmissible.”). 
 16. Bernstein, supra note 2. 
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In 2008, scholars estimated that between 50,000 and 100,000 
immigrant families were practicing polygamy in the United States.17 
In 2010, the United States accepted 101,355 immigrants from 
Africa alone,18 where an estimated 20 to 50 percent of marriages are 
polygamous.19 The largest percentages of immigrants attaining 
permanent-resident status in 2010 hailed from Ethiopia, Nigeria, and 
Egypt.20 The incidence of polygamy varies among these nations, with 
approximately 10 percent of Ethiopians21 engaging in polygamy, 
compared to the estimated 71 percent of Bajju Nigerians22 and 25 
percent of Egyptian men.23 A significant number of the legal 
permanent residents admitted to the United States in 2010 also came 
from the Middle East, where polygamy—although no longer the 
dominant form of marriage—retains a significant presence.24 
Approximately 3 percent of the United States’ 2010 immigrant 
population originated in Iraq and Iran,25 both of which allow men to 
take multiple wives.26 Other immigrant populations in the United 
 
 17. Hagerty, supra note 10. 
 18. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2010 
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 12–15 tbl.3 (2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2010/ois_yb_2010.pdf. 
 19. Nicholas Bala, Katherine Duvall-Antonacopoulos, Leslie MacRae & Joanne J. Paetsch, 
An International Review of Polygamy: Legal and Policy Implications for Canada, in POLYGAMY 
IN CANADA: LEGAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN report 2, at 16 
(2005), available at http://www.vancouversun.com/pdf/polygamy_021209.pdf. 
 20. In 2010, 14,266 legal permanent residents were admitted from Ethiopia, 13,376 legal 
permanent residents were admitted from Nigeria, and 8,978 legal permanent residents were 
admitted from Egypt. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 18, at 12–15 tbl.3. 
 21. See ETH. CENT. STATISTICAL AGENCY & ORC MACRO, ETHIOPIA DEMOGRAPHIC 
AND HEALTH SURVEY 2005, at 81 (2006), available at http://204.12.126.218/dhs/pubs/pdf/FR179/
FR179[23June2011].pdf (estimating that 5.1 percent of Ethiopian marriages include two or more 
co-wives). 
 22. Carol V. McKinney, Wives and Sisters: Bajju Marital Patterns, 31 ETHNOLOGY 75, 84 
(1992). 
 23. Reem Leila, Polygamous Duplicity, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY ON-LINE (Feb. 26, 2004), 
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/679/li1.htm. 
 24. Sigman, supra note 11, at 159. 
 25. In 2010, the United States admitted 14,182 Iranian nationals and 19,855 Iraqi nationals 
as legal permanent residents. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 20, at 12–15 
tbl.3. 
 26. In Iran, a man can have as many wives as “he desires or can afford.” Susan Tiefenben, 
The Semiotics of Women’s Human Rights in Iran, 23 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1, 63 (2007). Similarly, in 
Iraq, the law allows a man to take a second wife, provided that he obtains permission from a 
sharia judge. Dan E. Stigall, Iraqi Civil Law: Its Sources, Substance, and Sundering, 16 J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 51 (2006). 
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States hail from Saudi Arabia,27 where an estimated 19 percent of 
married women are in plural marriages,28 and from Jordan,29 where 
approximately 28 percent of women in the nation’s South Ghor 
region are in plural marriages.30 Thus, although polygamy sits in the 
crosshairs of an international debate, the influx of immigrants from 
polygamy-friendly countries into the United States suggests that its 
presence in the United States is largely shrouded in denial.31 
II.  THAT RELIC OF BARBARISM: MORMON POLYGAMY AND THE 
FEDERAL RESPONSE 
America’s struggle with polygamy largely began in the mid-
nineteenth century, when polygamy was adopted as a feature of the 
Mormon faith. Antipolygamists, who viewed the practice as a form of 
sexual slavery, enlisted lawmakers in their fight for female 
emancipation. Over time, however, public sentiment shifted against 
Mormon women as it became clear that they were willing participants 
in plural marriage. In response, legislators sought to deprive Mormon 
women of their political rights as retribution for their complicity. 
Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century, polygamy had morphed 
into both a rationale for alienation and a basis for exclusionary 
immigration policies. 
A. Polygamy in Antebellum America: Mormonism and Abolitionist 
Rhetoric 
America’s polygamy debate began with the Mormon Church’s 
endorsement of the practice.32 Although polygamy was not an original 
tenet of Mormonism, it was enshrined as a central teaching of the 
faith in 1843, when church leader Joseph Smith urged his followers to 
 
 27. See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 20, at 12–15 tbl.3 (noting that 
1263 Saudi Arabians were admitted as legal permanent residents in 2010). 
 28. TAWFIK A. KHOJA & SAMIR A. FARID, SAUDI ARABIA FAMILY HEALTH SURVEY 97 
(2000). 
 29. See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 20, at 12–15 tbl.3 (noting that 
3868 Jordanians were admitted as legal permanent residents in 2010). 
 30. Shuji Sueyosi & Ryutar Ohtsuka, Effects of Polygyny and Consanguinity on High 
Fertility in the Rural Arab Population in South Jordan, 35 J. BIOSOCIAL SCI. 513, 521 (2003). 
 31. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 2 (“[T]he picture that emerges . . . is of a clandestine 
practice that probably involves thousands of New Yorkers.”). 
 32. SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 1 (2002). 
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marry multiple women.33 Smith’s exhortation incited public outrage.34 
Although writers of popular literature were among the first to decry 
plural marriage,35 the most resounding condemnation came from 
politicians, who compared polygamy to the reviled practice of 
slavery.36 
The rhetorical comparison of polygamous marriage to slavery 
was not a novel concept in the Anglo-American legal tradition.37 
Rather, because “structurally, conceptually, and legally the 
[nineteenth-century] relations of husband to wife, and master to 
slave, were parallel,”38 slavery and polygamy were frequently 
regarded as analogous institutions. Early abolitionists vituperated 
against American slavery as an affront to the traditional marital 
institution because it created “a system in which marriage had no 
sanctity, and fathers sold, prostituted, and committed incest 
with . . . the daughters of their slave mistresses.”39 Antislavery 
politicians took the analogy one step further, likening Southerners’ 
“harem-like privileges over their female slaves” to the Mormon 
practice of polygamy.40 Abolitionist Ebenezer Rockwood Hoar, 
however, was the first critic to analogize polygamy and slavery 
directly, excoriating the practices as the “twin relics of barbarism.”41 
Driven by fears that the “unrestrained sexuality” common to both 
practices would beget “anti-Republican tendencies,”42 the 1856 
 
 33. Id. at 22. 
 34. Id. at 23. 
 35. Id. at 29. Popular literature focused on the plight of the Mormon women, who “met 
with one of two fates: the virtuous suffered, even died, the weak descended into viciousness and 
vulgarity.” Id. at 42. 
 36. Claire A. Smearman, Second Wives’ Club: Mapping the Impact of Polygamy in U.S. 
Immigration Law, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 382, 390 (2009). 
 37. NANCY COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 62 (2000). 
 38. Id. In Daniel Defoe’s 1740 novel Roxana, the heroine opines: “[T]he very Nature of the 
Marriage Contract was . . . nothing but giving up Liberty, Estate, Authority, and every-thing to 
the Man, and the Woman was indeed a meer Woman ever after, that is to say, a Slave.” DANIEL 
DEFOE, ROXANA 169 (Melissa Mowry ed., Broadview Press 2009) (1740). 
 39. COTT, supra note 40, at 58–59. 
 40. Id. at 73. 
 41. ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE 
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 130 (1995) (quoting Hoar) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 42. Kelly Elizabeth Phipps, Marriage and Redemption: Mormon Polygamy in the 
Congressional Imagination, 1862–1887, 95 VA. L. REV. 435, 445 (2009). 
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Republican platform resolved “to prohibit in the Territories those 
twin relics of barbarism—Polygamy, and Slavery.”43 
The antipolygamy campaign continued with the Morrill Anti-
Bigamy Act of 1862,44 which criminalized polygamy.45 Upon its 
introduction to the Senate, the act sparked a heated debate; in a 
speech entitled “The Barbarism of Slavery,” Senator Charles Sumner 
drew a comparison between polygamy, by which “one man may have 
many wives, all bound to him by the marriage tie,” and slavery, by 
which “a whole race is delivered over to prostitution and 
concubinage.”46 It was time, Senator Sumner concluded, to halt the 
“abrogation of marriage.”47 Despite subsequent challenges to the act’s 
validity, the Supreme Court upheld the Morill Anti-Bigamy Act in 
Reynolds v. United States,48 stating that it is well “within the legitimate 
scope of the power of every civil government to determine whether 
polygamy or monogamy shall be the law of social life under its 
dominion.”49 Despite its harsh rhetoric, however, the Morill Anti-
Bigamy Act failed to end the practice of polygamy.50 With the 
polygamous “twin” still conspicuously at large, Congress redoubled 
its efforts to emancipate Mormon women through a series of 
legislative measures. 
B. Antipolygamy Legislation During Reconstruction 
In the wake of the Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act’s failure to curtail 
polygamy, a group of radical politicians resurrected the polygamy 
debate in the hopes of expunging the “stain of human slavery.”51 The 
campaign, which began in 1867, rekindled the feminist rhetoric 
 
 43. REPUBLICAN NAT’L CONVENTION, REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM OF 1856 (1856), 
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29619. But see Phipps, supra 
note 42, at 447 (“[T]he 1856 Republican national platform did not reflect a defined anti-
polygamy agenda.”). 
 44. Morill Anti-Bigamy Act of 1862, ch. 126, 12 Stat. 501 (1862) (repealed 1910). 
 45. Id. § 1, 12 stat. at 501. 
 46. CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 259192 (1860) (statement of Sen. Sumner). 
 47. Id. at 2591 (emphasis omitted). Representative John Alexander McClernand 
expounded similar sentiments, calling polygamy “a scarlet whore” that “is often an adjunct to 
political despotism.” Id. at 1514 (statement of Rep. McClernand). 
 48. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879). 
 49. Id. at 166. 
 50. See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3574 (1870) (statement of Sen. Aaron Cragin) 
(“In 1862 Congress passed a law prohibiting polygamy in the Territories, and making it a crime; 
but the law is a dead letter, because the courts of Utah have no power to enforce it.”). 
 51. Id. at 2144 (statement of Rep. Elijah Ward). 
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espoused by polygamy’s early opponents. Congressman Elijah Ward 
denounced polygamy as a practice that undermined a woman’s “great 
ambition” by rendering her “a debauched and dishonored thing.”52 
Senator Aaron Cragin concurred, condemning the “devilish art of 
cunning men” who forced “ignorant and deluded women” into 
polygamy.53 These positions culminated in the proposal of the Cullom 
Bill54 of 1870 (Cullom Bill), which perpetuated the comparison of 
polygamy and slavery. The Cullom Bill sought to marginalize 
practicing polygamists by barring “any person living in or practicing 
bigamy, polygamy, or concubinage” from holding “any office of trust 
or profit” in territorial Utah, and further, by preventing such 
individuals from “vot[ing] at any election.”55 In addition, the bill 
required all elected government officials in the Utah Territory to take 
the following oath: “I am not living in or practicing bigamy, 
polygamy, or concubinage, and I will not hereafter live in or practice 
the same.”56 This oath, which the Cullom Bill’s proponents 
“unabashedly linked” to the Civil War’s ironclad oath of union 
loyalty, “was a powerful signifier of the political and social exclusion 
of Confederate sympathizers from the national community.”57 For the 
bill’s advocates, the oath requirement “directed similar symbolic 
exclusion at polygamous husbands.”58 
The Cullom Bill also used criminal law to attack practicing 
polygamists. The bill continued to prohibit polygamy and indeed 
reduced the evidentiary proof necessary to sustain a conviction. The 
proposed legislation decreed that “it shall not be necessary to prove 
either the first or subsequent marriages, by the registration or 
certificate thereof, . . . but the same may be proved by . . . proof of 
cohabitation [or the husband’s] acts recognizing, acknowledging, 
introducing, treating, or deporting himself toward them as [wives].”59 
For relationships that could not be successfully prosecuted under this 
evidentiary rubric, the bill created a new crime of “concubinage,” 
 
 52. Id. at 2143 (statement of Rep. Ward). 
 53. Id. at 3574 (statement of Sen. Cragin). 
 54. Cullom Bill, H.R. 1089, 41st Cong. (1870). 
 55. Id. § 19. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Phipps, supra note 42, at 45758. 
 58. Id. at 459. 
 59. Cullom Bill § 12. 
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which criminalized “cohabit[ation] with one woman or more, other 
than [a man’s] lawful wife.”60 
Despite its harsh stance against polygamous husbands, the bill 
took a more conciliatory approach toward plural wives. Motivated by 
fears that “suddenly break[ing] down the system of polygamy” would 
“leave the women and children of the [Utah] Territory helpless and 
dependent, and, perhaps, in a starving condition,”61 the drafters of the 
bill created a provision that obligated men who were convicted of 
“bigamy, polygamy, or of any adulterous or incestuous marriage” to 
provide financial support for their dependent wives, concubines, and 
children.62 To facilitate this support, the bill enabled courts to “order 
the sale of so much of the [man]’s personal property . . . as shall be 
needed for the support and maintenance of the wife, concubines, and 
children . . . until such time when such persons can procure labor or 
means to support themselves.”63 If a property sale was inadequate, the 
bill authorized government officials to furnish “temporary relief” to 
women “reduced to destitution by the enforcement of the laws 
against polygamy.”64 The bill, however, ultimately failed to clear the 
Senate.65 
Like the Cullom Bill, an early version of the Poland Act66 of 1874 
(Poland Act) sought to eliminate polygamy without undermining 
women’s rights. In an effort to facilitate federal polygamy 
prosecutions, the Poland Act stripped Utah county courts of all 
criminal and civil jurisdiction other than limited divorce, estate, 
guardianship, and related matters.67 This provision was designed to 
circumvent the Utah county probate courts, which were staffed with 
Mormon ecclesiastical leaders sympathetic to plural marriage.68 In the 
aftermath of the Act’s passage, “federal prosecutors began arresting 
Mormon leaders en masse,”69 in an effort to curtail polygamy. To 
 
 60. Id. § 13. 
 61. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1372 (1870) (statement of Rep. Shelby M. Cullom). 
 62. Cullom Bill § 30. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. § 31. 
 65. The bill failed in part because moderate Republicans refuted the analogy of polygamy 
to slavery. See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 2149 (1870) (statement of Rep. Austin Blair) 
(“[W]e cannot forget the fact that [plural wives] went there voluntarily.”). 
 66. Poland Act, ch. 469, 18 Stat. 253 (1874). 
 67. Id. § 3, 18 Stat. at 253–54. 
 68. Sigman, supra note 11, at 121. 
 69. Id. at 122. 
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mitigate the harsh consequences faced by women whose husbands 
would be arrested under the Act, an early incarnation of the Poland 
Act contained a provision—similar to one found in the Cullom Bill—
that would have enabled courts to give plural wives “such [a] 
reasonable sum for alimony . . . as the circumstances of the case will 
justify.”70 Advocating in favor of this provision, Senator George 
Edmunds argued that the law should afford the benefit of divorce to 
the victim of any relationship that was neither “sporadic” nor 
“criminal in the Mormon sense.”71 Senator Edmunds’s approach, 
however, was met with outrage from opponents who saw Mormon 
wives as exemplars of a morally bankrupt system. Senator Oliver 
Morton, for example, found it unthinkable that a man’s several wives 
should “acquire rights to [their husbands’] property as against his 
children and as against his relatives, where they are both in fault and 
both in crime.”72 Senator Eugene Casserly concurred, arguing that 
because polygamous marriages were illegal, a man’s subsequent wives 
should not be placed “on precisely the same footing with the lawful 
wife.”73 Ultimately, Congress voted against the Poland Act’s female-
protective provisions, relying instead on jurisdiction stripping to allow 
federal authorities to nullify plural marriages.74 
Unlike the Cullom Bill and the Poland Act, both of which 
considered giving subsequent wives putative rights to their voided 
marriages, the Edmunds Act75 of 1882 (Edmunds Act) refused to 
grant women any rights to their illicit unions. In addition to banning 
cohabitation, the Act disenfranchised both practicing polygamists and 
their wives.76 The Supreme Court upheld the Edmunds Act in 
Murphy v. Ramsay,77 praising the legislature’s choice of monogamy as 
the “best guaranty” of morality.78 After the Edmunds Act’s passage, 
an estimated 1300 Mormon men were prosecuted for polygamy.79 Yet 
 
 70. Poland Act, H.R. 3089, 43d Cong. § 3 (1874). 
 71. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. 1789 (1873) (statement of Sen. Edmunds). 
 72. Id. (statement of Sen. Morton). 
 73. Id. at 1800 (statement of Sen. Casserly); see also id. at 1795 (providing that polygamous 
marriages are “unlawful, simply null and void”). 
 74. See Sigman, supra note 11, at 121 n.134 (noting that “stripping courts of jurisdiction has 
been recognized as a tactic to achieve desired political results,” which, in this case, was the end 
of polygamous unions). 
 75. Edmunds Act, ch. 47, 22 Stat. 30 (1882) (repealed 1983). 
 76. Id. § 8, 22 Stat. at 31–32. 
 77. Murphy v. Ramsay, 114 U.S. 15 (1885). 
 78. Id. at 45. 
 79. Sigman, supra note 11, at 128. 
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as the alleged wives of indicted polygamists regularly perjured 
themselves to exonerate their husbands, Americans began to question 
whether Mormon women were the pawns or the perpetrators of 
plural marriage.80 Although some activists continued to argue that 
Mormon women were a marginalized class, others found it 
increasingly difficult to classify Mormon women as hapless victims.81 
Former advocates of emancipation instead began to recast Mormon 
women as the “lynchpin[s]” of their own enslavement.82 
In an attempt to inure a harsher stance against polygamists, 
Congress passed the Edmunds-Tucker Act83 of 1887 (Edmunds-
Tucker Act), which criminalized male adultery84 and repealed the 
incorporation of the Mormon Church.85 The law’s primary aim, 
however, was to bolster the foundering marital institution in the Utah 
territory by taking aim at Mormon women.86 In addition to 
criminalizing “fornication” by unmarried women,87 the act annulled 
illegitimate children’s succession rights88 and disenfranchised female 
voters.89 Many antipolygamists had come to regard the 
enfranchisement of Mormon women fifteen years earlier as a catalyst 
of female subversion, because the right to vote had done little to 
emancipate Mormon women.90 This perception was validated by a 
Mormon bishop’s remark that “[t]he women of Utah vote, and they 
never desert the colors of the church.”91 This perception of their 
loyalty earned Mormon women the unhappy reputation as the 
“catspaw of the [Mormon] priesthood.”92 Thus, the purpose of the 
 
 80. GORDON, supra note 32, at 16263. 
 81. Id. at 164. In her lecture entitled “The Mormon Monster,” contemporary commentator 
Kate Field echoed the shock among antipolygamists at the fact that “a female Mormon lobby 
ask[ed] Congress to give to Utah the liberty of self-degradation!” Id. (internal quotation mark 
omitted). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Edmunds-Tucker Act, ch. 397, 24 Stat. 635 (1887) (repealed 1978). 
 84. Id. § 3, 24 Stat. at 635–36. 
 85. Id. § 17, 24 Stat. at 638. 
 86. GORDON, supra note 32, at 167. 
 87. Edmunds-Tucker Act § 5, 24 Stat. at 636. 
 88. Id. § 11, 24 Stat. at 637. 
 89. Id. § 20, 24 Stat. at 639. 
 90. GORDON, supra note 32, at 168. 
 91. Id. Rather than using the newly enacted female vote to eliminate polygamy, Mormon 
women “overwhelmingly supported the election of Mormon candidates to public offices.” Omri 
Elisha, Sustaining Charisma: Mormon Sectarian Culture and the Struggle for Plural Marriage, 
18521890, 6 NOVA RELIGIO 45, 54 (2002). 
 92. GORDON, supra note 32, at 16870. 
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Edmunds-Tucker Act’s disenfranchisement provision was to “relieve 
the Mormon women of Utah from the slavehood” that the right to 
vote had failed to dispel.93 In recognizing that Mormon women were 
not passive victims of plural marriage, the Edmunds-Tucker Act 
signaled a turning point in the antipolygamy campaign. Mormon 
women, once the subjects of pity, had morphed into objects of public 
derision, their presence a chimera amid the nascent politics of 
emancipation. 
Polygamy’s legacy persisted long after Utah officially banned the 
practice as a condition of its admission to the United States in 1896.94 
During the course of the federal debate, polygamy had become 
synonymous with two of America’s most reviled practices: slavery and 
deviant sexuality. Yet the pall of moral opprobrium fell primarily on 
the women who capitulated to plural marriage, rather than on the 
men who indulged in the practice. As a result, polygamy assumed an 
unmistakably gendered connotation. 
C. Polygamy as a Mechanism for Exclusionist Policies 
Polygamy did not become a prominent facet of American 
immigration policy until the late nineteenth century, when an influx 
of Chinese laborers and their concubine wives prompted a public 
backlash. The wave of ensuing legislation barring Chinese immigrants 
borrowed the gendered concept of enslavement from the debate over 
Mormon polygamy. This exclusionary legislation branded polygamy 
as a new type of barbarism. 
Chinese immigration to the United States began in earnest in the 
1840s in response to an increased demand for cheap labor.95 Although 
anti-Chinese sentiment was not new, it reached a fever pitch in the 
1870s, when an economic downturn quickly gave rise to rhetoric 
decrying the Chinese “coolie” laborers who “worked too 
hard . . . saved too much, and spent too little.”96 Critics rallied against 
the influx of “Asiatic coolies” who forced American laborers “into 
 
 93. Id. at 171. Antipolygamists believed that “[w]omen who consented to a legitimate 
marriage . . . had made their choice and should thereafter defer to the political voice of their 
husbands, who would ‘represent’ the interest of the household at the polls.” Id. 
 94. See UTAH CONST. art. III, § 1 (“[P]olygamous or plural marriages are forever 
prohibited.”). 
 95. Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution and the Federalization of Immigration Law, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 641, 649 (2005). 
 96. CHARLES J. MCCLAIN, IN SEARCH OF EQUALITY: THE CHINESE STRUGGLE AGAINST 
DISCRIMINATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 10 (1995). 
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unjust and ruinous competition, by placing the white workingman 
entirely at the mercy of the coolie employer, and building up a system 
of slavery.”97 A substantial portion of the anti-Chinese sentiment was 
channeled into criticism of the Chinese marital structure, which 
condoned a hierarchy of primary wives, secondary wives, concubines, 
and prostitutes. Because most Chinese immigrants’ primary wives 
remained in China, the vast majority of Chinese women who entered 
the United States were situated further down in the marital 
hierarchy.98 Consequently, Chinese marital customs became more 
than a mere “signifier of [Chinese immigrants’] essential 
foreignness.”99 Rather, as Americans observed the fluid delineation 
between Chinese wives and prostitutes,100 Chinese marital customs 
became the focal point of anti-Chinese sentiment. 
Accordingly, it did not take long for legislators to seize on 
polygamy as a ground for Chinese exclusion. Arguing that 
intermarriage between native-born Americans and Chinese women 
“of a lower moral tone” would “cause a general moral 
deterioration,”101 federal legislators responded to Chinese polygamy 
in much the same way as they had to Mormon polygamy: by 
construing Chinese marriage as a form of institutionalized slavery.102 
Whereas American monogamy was premised on mutual consent, the 
Chinese marital system was characterized by a “sordid monetary 
exchange and . . . coercion on the part of the woman involved.”103 
According to legislators, Chinese marital traditions embodied a 
 
 97. Abrams, supra note 95, at 652 (quoting Anti-Chinese Convention, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 
19, 1870, at 3). 
 98. 3 CONG. REC. app. at 41 (1875) (statement of Rep. Horace F. Page). 
 99. Phipps, supra note 42, at 47; see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879) 
(“Polygamy has always been odious among the northern and western nations of Europe, and, 
until the establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost exclusively a feature of the life of 
Asiatic and of African people.”). 
 100. See Abrams, supra note 95, at 656 (“[T]he distinction between ‘wife’ and ‘prostitute’ 
was not static: Many women brought to the United States as prostitutes later escaped 
prostitution by becoming the wives of Chinese laborers.”). 
 101. COTT, supra note 37, at 135. 
 102. See Abrams, supra note 95, at 653 (“Americans responded to [Chinese marital customs 
with] a conviction that the Chinese treated all women . . . as slaves.”). 
 103. COTT, supra note 37, at 136; see also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1056 (1866) 
(statement of Rep. William Higby) (warning that because Chinese men “buy and sell their 
women like cattle, and the trade is mostly for the purpose of prostitution[,] . . . [y]ou cannot 
make citizens of them”); AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, 
MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 219 (1998) 
(“Prostitution appeared to embody all the forces threatening the legitimacy of contract as a 
model of freedom.”). 
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“benumbing despotism”104 at odds with the country’s newly minted 
politics of freedom.105 If left unchecked, critics contended, polygamy 
would “destroy [the white man’s] very being.”106 Such rhetoric created 
an “ominous variation” on the abolitionist theme.107 And, thus, the 
United States, by characterizing Chinese marital traditions as slavery 
and Chinese women as the instruments of enslavement, “justified 
denying [Chinese immigrants] the right to enter or remain in the 
United States.”108 
The Page Law109 of 1875 (Page Law), which took aim at the 
prostitutes who critics blamed for turning America into a “cess-pool” 
of depravity,110 was the first legislative measure targeting Chinese 
immigrant women.111 The Page Law barred any “subject of China, 
Japan or any Oriental country” who had “entered into a contract or 
agreement for a term of service . . . for lewd and immoral purposes” 
from immigrating to the United States.112 Legislators openly praised 
the measure for “send[ing] the brazen harlot . . . back to her native 
country,”113 and proponents hailed the law as the only way to prevent 
the “deadly blight” of Chinese immigration from corrupting 
American values.114 In practice, however, because immigration 
officials often failed to differentiate between prostitutes and wives 
within the Chinese marital hierarchy, the Page Law resulted in the 
exclusion of many legitimate Chinese wives from the United States.115  
Despite the Page Law’s passage and subsequent enforcement, 
legislators continued to lament the lack of “respectable” Chinese 
 
 104. S. REP. NO. 44-689, at vi (1876). 
 105. See 3 CONG. REC. app. at 44 (1875) (statement of Rep. Horace F. Page) (“[A] more 
insidious danger must eventuate by the great increase of this servile [Chinese laborer] 
population”); COTT, supra note 37, at 137 (“Prostitutes echoed the evil pinned on Chinese 
contract [‘coolie’] laborers: their presence in the United States signified coercion, more akin to 
the slavery tabooed a decade earlier than to the voluntary choice of welcomed migrants.”). 
 106. See Francis Lieber, The Mormons: Shall Utah Be Admitted into the Union?, 5 
PUTNAM’S MONTHLY 225, 234 (1855) (“Strike [monogamy] out, and you destroy [the civilized 
white man’s] very being . . . .”). 
 107. Phipps, supra note 42, at 473. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Page Law, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (1875) (repealed 1974). 
 110. 3 CONG. REC. app. at 44 (1875) (statement of Rep. Horace F. Page). 
 111. See Abrams, supra note 95, at 696–97 (“Section 3 made it a crime to import a woman 
into the United States for purposes of Prostitution.”). 
 112. Page Law § 1. 
 113. 3 CONG. REC. app. at 44 (1875) (statement of Rep. Horace F. Page). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Smearman, supra note 36, at 393–94. 
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immigrant women in America.116 Accordingly, legislators passed the 
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 (Exclusion Act),117 which effectively 
enabled immigration officials to regulate undesirable marriages. The 
law, which precluded all Chinese laborers from entering the United 
States and reduced the categories of permissible Chinese immigrants 
to merchants, ministers, sojourners, and students, made a wife’s 
immigration status contingent on her husband’s occupation.118 As a 
corollary, immigration officials were authorized to assess the validity 
of a Chinese marriage so as to determine whether a Chinese woman 
was truly the wife of a permissible immigrant.119 Six years later, the 
Scott Act120 of 1888 (Scott Act) took the Exclusion Act’s implicit 
regulation of marriage further by effectuating an expansive ban on 
the practice of foreign polygamy. The Scott Act barred Chinese 
laborers from reentering the United States after visiting China,121 a 
prohibition that prevented Chinese men from making their customary 
trips back to China to support the primary wives they had left 
behind.122 The Scott Act thus prohibited Chinese immigrants from 
maintaining “cross-continental” polygamous families.123 
Anti-Chinese legislation was, in many respects, an outgrowth of 
the Mormon debate. Linked by the common rhetoric of slavery, the 
discourse surrounding both Mormon and Chinese polygamy cast 
these practices as aberrational forces in an otherwise-free society. 
And in both instances, women were construed as the perpetuators of 
social deviance. To insulate America from polygamy, legislators made 
polygamous immigrants categorically inadmissible. Although 
immigration law has long since lost its xenophobic overtones, gender 
nonetheless remains a powerful subtext of the United States’ modern 
polygamy bar. 
 
 116. Abrams, supra note 95, at 708. 
 117. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943). 
 118. Abrams, supra note 95, at 711; see also In re Ah Moy, 21 F. 785, 785 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884) 
(holding that a Chinese immigrant’s wife was ineligible for entry because her status was 
contingent on her husband’s occupation as a laborer). 
 119. Abrams, supra note 95, at 712; see also In re Lum Lin Ying, 59 F. 682, 682–84 (D. Or. 
1894) (holding that an arranged marriage between a Chinese couple was valid in part because 
the woman was not a prostitute). 
 120. Scott Act, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504 (1888) (repealed 1943). 
 121. Id. § 1, 25 Stat. at 504. 
 122. Abrams, supra note 95, at 710. 
 123. Id. 
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D. Polygamy and Twentieth-Century Immigration Laws 
U.S. immigration law has excluded practicing polygamists since 
1891.124 Although scholars debate whether this ban was a result of 
anti-Mormon or anti-Chinese sentiment,125 it does allow the federal 
government to reshape marriages it finds inimical to American 
values. 
The Immigration Act of 1891126 was the first federal immigration 
law to categorically bar polygamy. The act grouped polygamists with 
the other specimens of Victorian depravity: “idiots, insane 
persons . . . [and] persons suffering from a loathsome or a dangerous 
contagious disease.”127 The Immigration Act of 1907 (the 1907 Act)128 
followed shortly thereafter, and was passed amid fears that America’s 
“temperate blood . . . [was] yearly experiencing a partial corruption of 
foreign blood.”129 Although the 1907 Act left most excludable 
categories the same, it broadened the polygamy bar to encompass 
“persons who admit their belief in the practice of polygamy.”130 A 
decade later, the Immigration Act of 1917131 retained this broad 
exclusionary language, forbidding the entry of “polygamists, or 
persons who practice polygamy or believe in or advocate the practice 
of polygamy.”132 The subsequent Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA),133 as enacted in 1952, removed “belief” as a basis for exclusion 
but continued to preclude “polygamists . . . who practice polygamy or 
advocate the practice of polygamy.”134 The 1952 law’s polygamy bar 
remained unchanged until the Immigration Act of 1990135 further 
 
 124. Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084. 
 125. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 95, at 711 (arguing that American immigration policy was 
formulated as a continuation of anti-Chinese sentiment). But see, e.g., COTT, supra note 37, at 
139 (arguing that excluding polygamists was “a legacy of the campaign against Mormon 
polygamy”). 
 126. Immigration Act of 1891, 26 Stat. 1084. 
 127. Id. § 1, 26 Stat. at 1084. 
 128. Immigration Act of 1907, ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 898. 
 129. COTT, supra note 37, at 140 (quoting then-scholar Woodrow Wilson). 
 130. Immigration Act of 1907 § 2, 34 Stat. at 898–99. 
 131. Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874 (repealed 1952). 
 132. Id. § 3, 39 Stat. at 875–78. 
 133. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2006)). 
 134. Id. § 212(a)(11), 66 Stat. at 182. 
 135. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
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confined inadmissibility to immigrants “coming to the United States 
to practice polygamy.”136 
The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)137 of 1996 crystallized 
America’s intolerance for polygamy by defining marriage as “only a 
legal union between one man and one woman.”138 Unsurprisingly, the 
current polygamy bar bears DOMA’s imprimatur. Under 
§ 212(a)(10)(A) of the INA, “[a]ny immigrant who is coming to the 
United States to practice polygamy is inadmissible.”139 Section 
212(a)(10)(A) precludes practicing polygamists from attaining any 
category of legal-resident status, including a status obtained through 
participation in the diversity lottery,140 selection as a special 
immigrant,141 or admission through employment programs.142 Section 
212(a)(10)(A) further prohibits practicing polygamists from gaining 
legal residency through adjustment-of-status proceedings.143 
Polygamous families that elude the polygamy bar risk immediate 
deportation144 without the possibility of cancellation of removal.145 
 
 136. Id. sec. 601(a), § 212(a)(9)(A), 104 Stat. at 5075. 
 137. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 
U.S.C. § 7 (2006) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C). 
 138. Id. sec. 3(a), § 7, 110 Stat. at 2419 (emphasis added). Although DOMA is primarily 
aimed at preventing homosexual marriage, scholars argue that it also precludes polygamy. See 
Nicole Lawrence Ezer, The Intersection of Immigration Law and Family Law, 40 FAM. L.Q. 339, 
345 (2006) (noting that “Congress intended the terms ‘spouse’ and ‘marriage’ to include only the 
partners to a legal, monogamous marriage” (quoting Memorandum from William R. Yates, 
Acting Assoc. Dir. of Operations, Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Servs., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to Reg’l & Serv. Ctr. Dirs. (Mar. 20, 2003))). A number of courts have declared Section 
3 of DOMA unconstitutional. See, e.g., In re Balas, 449 B.R. 567, 579 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011) 
(“[T]here is no valid governmental basis for DOMA. . . . [T]he court finds that DOMA violates 
the equal protection rights of the Debtors as recognized under the due process clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.”); Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 387 (D. Mass. 2010) 
(holding that DOMA “violates core constitutional principles of equal protection”). Further, 
President Obama announced that his administration would no longer defend DOMA. Charlie 
Savage & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, In Turnabout, U.S. Says Marriage Act Blocks Gay Rights, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 24, 2011, at A1. 
 139. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 212(a)(10)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(10)(A) 
(2006). 
 140. INA § 203(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c). 
 141. Id. § 101(a)(27), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27). 
 142. Id. § 203(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1). 
 143. Id. § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1225. An adjustment of status allows admissible individuals to 
apply for resident status from within the United States. Id. 
 144. Id. § 237(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1227. 
 145. See id. § 240A(b)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(1)(B) (providing that the cancellation of 
removal for inadmissible nonpermanent residents requires a finding of good moral character, 
for which practicing polygamists are statutorily ineligible under INA § 101(f), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(f)). 
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In addition to rendering marriage the “central organizing 
principle” of American immigration policy,146 the foregoing laws 
sanction intolerance of marriages that fall outside a narrow 
conception of acceptability. In essence, the polygamy bar enables 
officials to force polygamous marriages into the ill-fitting dimensions 
of the traditional nuclear family. Although the polygamy bar has 
progressed from its openly xenophobic predecessors, gender remains 
an inexorable subtext of the current regulations. As Part III discusses, 
the bar’s differential impact on the wives of polygamous immigrants 
resonates with the gendered underpinnings of the nineteenth-century 
polygamy debate. 
III.  POLYGAMY UNDER U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW 
America’s polygamy bar has profound consequences for 
immigrant women. Because inadmissibility is limited to immigrants 
who intend to practice polygamy in the United States, a polygamous 
husband is free to immigrate, but he may sponsor only one wife. As a 
result, American immigration laws sanction and exacerbate a power 
differential that allows a man to emigrate unilaterally with the wife 
and children of his choosing.147 
A. Family-Based Immigration 
Modern immigration law is premised on a policy of family 
unification.148 Under the INA, foreigners who wish to immigrate are 
accorded a preference status based on their familial relationship with 
either U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents. Family-sponsored 
visas are divided into two categories: the first, immediate-relative 
preference visas, allows an unlimited number of visas for the spouses, 
parents, and children of U.S. citizens;149 the second, family preference 
visas, allows a limited number of visas for the children and spouses of 
 
 146. Kerry Abrams, Regulation of Marriage, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1625, 1633 (2007). 
 147. See infra notes 158–61 and accompanying text; text accompanying note 192. 
 148. See Monique Lee Hawthorne, Family Unity in Immigration Law: Broadening the Scope 
of Family, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 809, 815 (2007) (“The INA is full of expressions of 
legislative concern for the protection and reunification of families.”). One historical 
underpinning of immigration legislation has been “the problem of keeping families of United 
States Citizens and immigrants united.” Fiallo v. Bell, 436 U.S. 757, 795 n.6 (1977) (quoting H.R. 
REP. NO. 85-1119, at 6 (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2016, 2020); accord Lau v. Kiley, 
563 F.2d 542, 547 (2d Cir. 1977) (noting that family reunification is “the foremost policy 
underlying the granting of preference visas under our immigration laws”). 
 149. INA § 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). 
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legal permanent residents.150 The alien beneficiary of any family-based 
visa may petition for a spouse and any unmarried children to be 
classified as derivative beneficiaries. This derivative status affords 
petitioners the same preference status and priority filing date 
accorded to principal aliens.151 Non-family-sponsored immigrants 
must rely on either humanitarian visas—which include refugee, 
asylum, and Violence Against Women and Department of Justice 
Reauthorization Act of 2005 (VAWA)152 visas—or employment visas 
for admission. As a consequence, members of a polygamous 
household seeking to immigrate must either fit within the narrow 
definition of spouse or qualify for humanitarian- or employment-
based ingress. 
B. Inadmissibility’s Gendered Impact on Plural Wives 
Existing immigration laws make every effort to recognize foreign 
marriages.153 To ascertain the validity of a foreign marriage, 
immigration officials determine first whether the marriage is valid in 
its place of celebration and second whether the union is consistent 
with U.S. public policy.154 Because polygamous marriages violate 
DOMA,155 they “cannot be recognized for immigration purposes even 
if the marriage is legal in the place of marriage celebration.”156 
 
 150. The preference categories are as follows: first preference, comprising unmarried 
children of U.S. citizens over the age of twenty-one under INA § 203(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1153(a)(1); second preference, comprising unmarried children of legal permanent residents 
under INA § 203(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2); third preference, comprising married children of 
U.S. citizens under INA § 203(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(3); and fourth preference, comprising 
siblings aged twenty-one or older of U.S. citizens under INA § 203(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(4). 
 151. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 9 FAM 42.31(d) (2009). 
 152. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, 
Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 6, 8, 18, 
21, 22, 25, 28, 31, 42, 47, and 49 U.S.C.). 
 153. See United States v. Sacco, 428 F.2d 264, 268 (9th Cir. 1970) (noting that immigration 
law should recognize foreign marriages that were valid in the place where they were 
celebrated). 
 154. Smearman, supra note 36, at 404–05. 
 155. See supra note 138. 
 156. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 151, § 9 FAM 40.1 note 1.1(d); see also, e.g., 
Adomako, A99 365 109, 2006 WL 3712508, at *1 (B.I.A. Nov. 20, 2006) (“[P]olygamous 
marriage, which may or may not be valid in Ghana where performed . . . cannot be 
recognized . . . for immigration purposes . . . because the marriage is repugnant to United States 
public policy.”); Mujahid, 15 I. & N. Dec. 546, 547 (B.I.A. 1976) (denying an Egyptian citizen’s 
petition on behalf of his wife because the marriage had taken place when he was still married to 
his first wife). 
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These existing immigration laws, however, do not exclude 
individuals merely because they have been in plural marriages. 
Instead, the INA articulates a more nuanced bar: it only prohibits 
immigrants who plan to continue practicing polygamy in the United 
States.157 As a consequence, a polygamous husband can immigrate, but 
he can sponsor only one of his wives.158 Because a husband’s first 
marriage is presumptively valid, a petition on behalf of his first wife 
will be approved regardless of whether he divorces his subsequent 
wives.159 If, however, the husband wishes to sponsor one of his 
subsequent wives, he must terminate all of his prior marriages160 
before entering the United States.161 Although subsequent wives in a 
polygamous marriage may temporarily visit the United States,162 they 
are statutorily ineligible to immigrate with their families. As the 
following Sections discuss, this reality has the most profound effects 
on women who seek to immigrate under special immigrant visas as 
refugees, as asylees, or as battered women. 
 
 157. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 151, § 9 FAM 40.101 note 2. 
 158. Smearman, supra note 36, at 407; see also Nora Demleitner, How Much Do Western 
Democracies Value Family and Marriage?: Immigration Law’s Conflicted Answers, 32 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 273, 279 (“Western countries generally deny recognition to polygamous marriages, 
which means only the first wife can benefit from spousal unification.”). 
 159. See SARAH B. IGNATIUS & ELISABETH S. STICKNEY, IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE 
FAMILY § 4:18 (2008) (“[Officials] will recognize the polygamist’s first marriage without 
question; he need not end his subsequent marriages for his first spouse to obtain immigration 
benefits.”); see also Nwangwu, 16 I. & N. Dec. 61, 62 (B.I.A. 1976) (“Any pre-existing valid 
marriage is a bar to our recognition of the [subsequent] marriage on which the visa petition is 
based.”). 
 160. ANNA MARIE GALLAGHER & SHANE DIZON, IMMIGRATION LAW SERVICE § 7:8 (2d 
ed. 2008) (“[B]efore [the husband’s] third-in-time wife may immigrate based on their marriage, 
the man must divorce the two wives that he married before her but need not divorce the fourth 
wife.”). Whether a divorce is validly obtained hinges on the laws of the parties’ domicile. See, 
e.g., Weaver, 16 I. & N. Dec. 730, 730 (B.I.A. 1979) (holding that a divorce is valid in the United 
States if it was valid in the place where the parties were domiciled at the time of the divorce). 
 161. GALLAGHER & DIZON, supra note 160, § 7:9. 
 162. Nonimmigrant visas are temporary visas for foreign nationals who do not intend to 
relocate permanently to the United States, Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 
§ 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (2006); id. § 101(a)(26), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(26), and they are 
issued regardless of the applicant’s intent to practice polygamy, id. § 212(d)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(d)(3)(A); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 151, § 9 FAM 40.101 note 4 (2009). The 
Foreign Affairs Manual, supra note 151, however, cautions against the use of the nonimmigrant 
visa as an illicit backdoor. See id. § 9 FAM 40.101 note 2 (2009) (“For example, an alien who 
believes in the practice of polygamy and who has divorced all but one of his wives just prior to 
visa application would arouse suspicion if it were known that the divorced spouse had recently 
obtained a nonimmigrant visa.”). 
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1. The Effect of the Polygamy Bar on Asylum Seekers and 
Refugees.  The ban on polygamous marriage “presents particular 
problems for refugees and asylum seekers.”163 To qualify for asylum, 
foreign nationals must demonstrate that they face a “well-founded 
fear of persecution.”164 Asylum is awarded on a discretionary basis 
after qualifying nationals have arrived in the United States.165 Because 
immigration officials have statutory discretion to waive certain 
admissibility requirements, including the ban on polygamy,166 
practicing polygamists are eligible for asylum.167 Polygamy will, 
however, affect the principal aslyee’s ability to petition for asylum on 
behalf of multiple spouses as derivative beneficiaries. A spouse can 
obtain derivative asylum status only if he or she is validly married to 
the principal petitioner at the time of application.168 Because 
polygamous marriages are categorically invalid for immigration 
purposes, subsequent wives are ineligible for derivative-beneficiary 
status169 and must therefore petition independently for asylum.170 
Practicing polygamists may also encounter problems under the 
polygamy bar if they attempt to adjust their status from asylees to 
permanent residents,171 as adjustments of status take inadmissibility 
into account.172 Nonetheless, immigration officials do have discretion 
to waive most grounds of inadmissibility—including polygamy—when 
humanitarian considerations demand a more equitable approach.173 
The polygamy bar poses a greater problem for refugees. 
Refugees are individuals facing persecution in their countries of 
origin who, unlike asylees, petition for visas from outside the United 
States.174 To obtain refugee status, immigrants must establish that they 
 
 163. Demleitner, supra note 158, at 279. 
 164. To qualify for asylum, immigrants must demonstrate that they fit within the INA’s 
definition of “refugee.” INA § 208(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). As defined under INA 
§ 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A), a refugee is “any person who is outside any country 
of such person’s nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return to . . . that country 
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution,” id. 
 165. Id. § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158; 8 C.F.R. § 208 (2011). 
 166. 8 C.F.R. § 209.2(a)(v). 
 167. Smearman, supra note 36, at 436. 
 168. 8 C.F.R. § 208.21(b). 
 169. Smearman, supra note 36, at 437–38. 
 170. Hagerty, supra note 10. 
 171. Asylees have the option to adjust their status under 8 C.F.R. § 209.2(a)(1). 
 172. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2006). 
 173. Id. § 209(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c); 8 C.F.R. § 209.2(b). 
 174. INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). 
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are otherwise eligible to immigrate under INA § 212(a).175 As is the 
case with asylees, however, immigration officials have discretion to 
waive the polygamy bar both initially—when refugees seek to 
immigrate176—and subsequently—when refugees file for adjustment 
of status.177 Nonetheless, as is the case in the asylum process, 
subsequent wives, who are statutorily ineligible to qualify as 
spouses,178 cannot be accorded derivative-beneficiary status and must 
apply as refugees independently from their husbands.179 Therefore, 
subsequent wives in polygamous marriages will not receive refugee 
visas concurrently with their families. Because refugees petition from 
outside the United States, this delay may force a husband’s multiple 
wives to be subjected to the atrocities their families are attempting to 
flee. The United States’ approach has been met with chagrin from the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, an agency that 
“recognizes polygamous marriages in its criteria of eligible 
unions . . . and prefers to refer such cases to resettlement 
countries . . . that would allow the resettlement of the whole 
family.”180 
Realizing that a rigid antipolygamy policy is inimical to both 
family reunification and humanitarianism, the United States has 
occasionally waived the polygamy bar. During the first Gulf War, for 
example, the United States tacitly overlooked its antipolygamy laws 
when it admitted polygamous Iraqi families who had aided in the 
United States’ war efforts.181 This kind of exception, however, is a 
rarity, and “[f]amily unification outside the refugee context always 
excludes polygamous spouses.”182 
 
 175. 8 C.F.R. § 207.3. 
 176. INA § 207(c)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(3). 
 177. Id. § 209(c)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c)(3). Unlike asylees, refugees must apply for an 
adjustment of status within one year of immigrating to the United States. Id. § 209(a)(1), 8 
U.S.C. § 1159(a)(1). 
 178. See supra Part IV.B. 
 179. See INA § 207(c)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(2)(A) (“A spouse . . . of any refugee who 
qualifies for admission . . . shall . . . be entitled to the same admission status as such refugee if 
accompanying, or following to join, such refugee and if the spouse . . . is admissible (except as 
otherwise provided under paragraph (3)).”). 
 180. U.N. Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement, Geneva, Switz., June 20–21, 
2001, Background Note: Protecting the Family: Challenges in Implementing Policy in the 
Resettlement Context 6, http://www.unhcr.org/3b30baa04.html. 
 181. Demleitner, supra note 158, at 279. 
 182. Id. 
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2. The Polygamy Bar’s Effect on Women Self-Petitioning for a 
VAWA Visa.  Foreign plural wives also face difficulties if they 
attempt to immigrate through a VAWA visa. VAWA permits 
immigrant women who have been abused by their U.S.-citizen or 
legal-permanent-resident husbands to self-petition for permanent-
resident status.183 To qualify, an immigrant woman must prove that 
she entered into a bona fide marriage with her spouse,184 that she or 
her child was “battered” or subjected to “extreme cruelty,”185 and that 
she was a person of “good moral character” in the three years 
preceding her petition.186 VAWA, however, is inapplicable to women 
in polygamous marriages on three independent grounds. First, 
although VAWA exonerates women who believed that their 
bigamous marriages were in fact monogamous at the time they 
entered into their unions, it makes no exception for women who 
knowingly entered into polygamous marriages.187 Second, according to 
both DOMA and the INA, subsequent wives have not entered into 
“bona fide marriage[s]” within the meaning of VAWA.188 Third, and 
finally, women in polygamous marriages are “statutorily ineligible”189 
for the requisite finding of “good moral character.”190 VAWA thus 
 
 183. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005 
§ 811, 119 Stat. at 3057. 
 184. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 204(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(aa)(CC), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(aa)(CC) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
 185. Id. § 204(a)(1)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii). 
 186. Id. § 204(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(bb), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(bb). 
 187. See id. § 204(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(aa)(BB), 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (a)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(aa)(BB) 
(exempting petitioners whose marriages are invalid “solely because of the bigamy of the 
[abusive spouse]”). The Foreign Affairs Manual distinguishes bigamy, “a criminal act resulting 
from having more than one spouse at a time without benefit of a prior divorce[,]” from 
polygamy, “the historical custom or religious practice of having more than one wife or husband 
at the same time.” U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 151, § 9 FAM 40.101 note 1. Whereas 
parties to a polygamous marriage intentionally enter into a plural union, bigamy often occurs 
when one spouse fails to obtain a valid divorce from a prior marriage. See id. (“Bigamy may 
imply wrongdoing on the part of one of the spouses in failing to inform the other spouse . . . of 
an existing marriage. . . . [Bigamy] may render an alien ineligible for an immigrant visa . . . if the 
alien purposely married more than one wife or husband at the same time based on historical 
custom or religious practice.” (emphasis added and omitted)). 
 188. INA § 204(a)(1)(A)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)–(B). 
 189. Smearman, supra note 36, at 423. 
 190. See INA § 101(f)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3) (“No person shall be regarded as . . . a 
person of good moral character who, during the period for which good moral character is 
required to be established is, or was[,] . . . a member of one or more classes of 
persons . . . described in paragraphs (2)(D), (6)(E), and (10)(A) . . . .”). According to Professor 
Claire Smearman, although INA § 204(a)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(C), “provides that a self-
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creates insurmountable hurdles for battered wives in polygamous 
marriages who self-petition for resident status.191 
C. Immigration and Children of Polygamous Households 
Whereas additional wives in polygamous marriages are 
statutorily ineligible for both legal-permanent-resident status and 
special-visa status, the child of a polygamous marriage can immigrate 
to the United States on four independent grounds: as a child born in 
wedlock, as a stepchild, as a legitimate child, or as a child born out of 
wedlock. This framework effectively bifurcates foreign polygamous 
families by enabling a husband, a wife of his choosing, and all of his 
children to immigrate to the United States, leaving the additional 
wives behind.192 
Children of polygamous unions are eligible for entry as “children 
born in wedlock”193 if they are the products of a valid marriage.194 
Because immigration law recognizes only a polygamous husband’s 
marriage with his first-in-time wife, children will only qualify for this 
category if they are products of that marriage.195 Children of 
additional wives must therefore obtain entry under one of the three 
remaining visa categories. 
Unlike the “children born in wedlock” designation, the 
“stepchild” visa196 “benefits members of a polygamous family in 
unexpected ways.”197 Under INA § 101(b)(1)(B), the children of a 
polygamous union may qualify as stepchildren of their father’s 
 
petitioner who would be barred from a finding of good moral character as a result of an act or 
conviction encompassed in the . . . statutory bars will not be precluded from a finding of good 
moral character if she establishes that the act or conviction was connected to the abuse she 
suffered,” this exception is inapplicable to foreign plural wives. Smearman, supra note 36, at 
423–24. 
 191. Battered and abused women in polygamous marriages may, however, self-petition for 
legal-permanent-resident status under a U visa, which allows noncitizens who have suffered 
“substantial physical or mental abuse” as a result of criminal activity to self-petition for 
nonimmigrant status if they have aided or are likely to aid in a governmental investigation of the 
perpetrator. INA § 101(a)(15)(U)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i). Unlike a VAWA visa, a U 
visa does not require a finding of good moral character, id. § 101(a)(15)(U)(i), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(15)(U)(i), and gives the secretary of homeland security substantial discretion to waive 
inadmissibility, see id. § 212(d)(14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(14). 
 192. See supra Part III.A–B. 
 193. INA § 101(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(A). 
 194. See id. 
 195. Smearman, supra note 36, at 410. 
 196. INA § 101(b)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(B). 
 197. Smearman, supra note 36, at 413. 
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immigrated wife as long as the marriage between the stepparent and 
the natural parent—in this instance, the marriage between the 
children’s natural father and his immigrated wife—is valid for 
immigration purposes and as long as the marriage occurred while the 
children were minors.198 The stepchild designation thus allows the 
immigrated wife in a polygamous marriage to petition on behalf of all 
of her husband’s children, including those from his additional wives.199 
If the immigrated wife does not wish to sponsor the children 
from her husband’s other marriages, her husband may nonetheless 
sponsor all of his children as “legitimated children” or as “children 
born out of wedlock.” A child qualifies as a legitimated child if he or 
she resides in the custody of the legitimating parent and the 
legitimation occurred in accordance with the laws of the child’s 
domicile200 before he or she reached the age of majority.201 As the 
Board of Immigration Appeals held in Kubicka,202 formal legitimation 
can overcome a child’s polygamous parentage.203 Moreover, formal 
legitimation is unnecessary if a child comes from a jurisdiction that 
recognizes polygamy because children born to solemnized 
polygamous unions are treated as legitimated from birth.204 
Alternatively, a polygamous father can petition for his children as 
 
 198. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 151, § 9 FAM 40.1 note 2.2; see also Awwal, 19 I. & 
N. Dec. 617, 621 (B.I.A. 1988) (holding that relationships between a stepchild and a stepparent 
must be premised on a valid marriage between the child’s natural parent and the stepparent). 
As long as the qualifying marriage is intact at the time of entry, the stepparent need not show a 
demonstrable emotional connection with the child. Vizcaino, 19 I. & N. Dec. 644, 648 (B.I.A. 
1988). 
 199. See Fong, 17 I. & N. Dec. 212, 21213 (B.I.A. 1980) (allowing a naturalized citizen born 
to his father’s second wife to petition on behalf of his father’s first wife because the petitioner 
claimed “a relationship to his father’s [valid] ‘first’ wife”). The relationship between the 
stepchild and the stepparent, however, cannot be used to confer immigration privileges upon 
illicit polygamous marriages. See Man, 16 I. & N. Dec. 543, 544 (B.I.A. 1978) (“It has never been 
held . . . that the secondary wife can derive or bestow immigration benefits through children 
born to the husband and his principal wife.”). 
 200. The requirements of legitimation are jurisdiction-specific and can occur in a variety of 
ways, including through operation of law, judicial decree, marriage, and acknowledgment. 
IGNATIUS & STICKNEY, supra note 159, §§ 6:22:25. 
 201. INA § 101(b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(d)(2)(ii) (2011). 
 202. Kubicka, 14 I. & N. Dec. 303 (B.I.A. 1972). 
 203. See id. at 304 (“It has never been held . . . that the secondary wife can derive or bestow 
immigration benefits through children born to the husband and his principal wife.”). 
 204. See Smearman, supra note 36, at 413 (“In a jurisdiction where polygamy is legal and the 
child is recognized as legitimate, the father of a child born to a second or subsequent wife who 
has acknowledged and supported the child as his own will easily establish that the child is 
‘legitimated’ under [the INA].”). 
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“children born out of wedlock” as long as the children have “bona 
fide parent-child relationship[s]” with their natural fathers.205 Because 
evidence of a father’s bona fide relationship has been interpreted to 
include “an active concern for the child’s support, instruction, and 
general welfare,”206 in a jurisdiction where polygamy is legal and in a 
case in which a father has publicly acknowledged the children of his 
plural wives, the children should qualify as “children out of wedlock” 
from birth.207 
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, whereas a polygamous 
man’s additional wives face tremendous barriers to entry, the children 
of polygamous unions can immigrate without their biological mothers 
under a variety of legal theories. The United States’ immigration bar 
thus treats the offspring of polygamous relationships as innocent 
bystanders to illicit unions, singling out polygamous consorts for their 
participation in plural marriage. 
D. Inadmissibility’s Gendered Impact 
Since the nineteenth century, polygamists have been cast in an 
immoral light. As evidenced by the statutory definition of “good 
moral character,” which groups practicing polygamists with 
prostitutes and Nazis, this negative perception endures.208 This legacy 
is most keenly expressed in the United States’ polygamy bar, which 
creates disproportionate hardships for women in polygamous 
marriages. Whereas a polygamous husband can freely immigrate with 
the wife of his choosing, women in polygamous marriages can only 
immigrate at their husbands’ whims. As a result, polygamous 
husbands have the power to decide where each of their wives 
resides.209 In the case of refugees, those decisions may condemn the 
wives left behind to suffer the very atrocities that their families have 
fled.210 Polygamy also precludes battered women from self-petitioning 
for status as legal permanent residents under VAWA.211 Further, 
because children can immigrate regardless of their parents’ marital 
 
 205. INA § 101(b)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(D). 
 206. 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(d)(2)(iii). 
 207. See Smearman, supra note 36, at 413 (noting that a father can “easily establish” a bona 
fide parent-child relationship if he raises and supports a child born to a second wife, the child 
was born in a jurisdiction where polygamy is legal, and the child is recognized as legitimate). 
 208. INA § 101(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f). 
 209. Smearman, supra note 36, at 442. 
 210. See supra Part III.B. 
 211. See supra Part III.B. 
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status, a husband can unilaterally divest his wives of child custody.212 
Although children can petition on behalf of the mothers they leave 
behind, they cannot do so until they are naturalized citizens and are 
at least twenty-one years of age. 
Moreover, plural wives who enter the United States by 
circumventing the immigration bar remain “invisible”213 under the 
American legal system.214 Because their marriages are not recognized 
under any state law,215 these wives are not entitled to the benefits of 
either divorce216 or spousal support.217 It is also unlikely that the wives 
of polygamous immigrants will be entitled to any succession rights if 
their husbands die intestate.218 Finally, if a polygamous husband 
chooses to abandon his multiple wives after immigrating, the women 
have no legal recourse against their polygamous spouses219 and will 
often face grave financial insecurity as a result.220 In essence, 
immigrant women in polygamous unions are specters of a legal 
system that once fought for their emancipation. Instead of deterring 
 
 212. See supra Part III.C. 
 213. Hagerty, supra note 10 (quoting Julie Dinnerstein, senior attorney with Sanctuary for 
Families) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 214. See supra Part III. 
 215. Polygamous marriages are illegal in all fifty states. See, e.g., IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 4 
(“Bigamy and polygamy are forever prohibited in the state . . . .”); N.M. CONST. art. XXI, § 1 
(“Polygamous or plural marriages and polygamous cohabitation are forever prohibited.”); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-201(1) (2011) (“Any married person who, while still married, marries 
or cohabits in this state with another commits bigamy . . . .”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-101(1) 
(LexisNexis 2008) (“A person is guilty of bigamy when, knowing he has a husband or wife or 
knowing the other person has a husband or wife, the person purports to marry another person 
or cohabits with another person.”). 
 216. See MARGARET C. JASPER, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 22–23 (3d ed. 2008) (explaining 
that intentionally bigamous marriages cannot be “ratified, or validated” and that therefore the 
parties to these marriages are also not entitled to divorce). 
 217. See Bernstein, supra note 2 (noting that there is “little case law to guide decisions on 
marital property or benefits” in polygamous families). 
 218. Although no domestic court has squarely addressed the issue of succession rights for 
immigrant plural wives residing in the United States, at least two cases have implied that these 
women would not be entitled to succession rights. See, e.g., In re Dalip Singh Bir’s Estate, 188 
P.2d 499, 502 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948) (stating that although the decedent’s two wives domiciled in 
India were entitled to an equal division of their husband’s estate, they would not have obtained 
relief “if [the] decedent had attempted to cohabit with his two wives in California”); In re Estate 
of Diba, No. 642-A/97, 2010 WL 2696611, at *1–2 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. July 8, 2010) (holding that the 
proceeds of the decedent husband’s wrongful-death suit, which had been commenced against a 
New York domiciliary, could lawfully be distributed to the decedent’s two spouses in Senegal 
who “always were, and remain, citizens and domiciliaries of Senegal”). 
 219. Bernstein, supra note 2. 
 220. See id. (describing an immigrant from the Ivory Coast who left her polygamous 
husband and who, “[w]ithout [immigration] papers, . . . ended up in a homeless shelter”). 
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plural marriages, this approach forces practicing polygamists 
underground, perpetuating the cycle of “abuse and exploitation” that 
is sometimes synonymous with modern-day polygamy221 and depriving 
women of the benefits that marriage confers.222 
IV.  THE WESTERN WORLD’S CONFLICTED SOLUTIONS 
The United States’ categorical polygamy bar differs from the 
immigration laws of its peer nations, which have taken more 
tempered approaches toward women in foreign polygamous unions. 
Although Canada and the United Kingdom share the United States’ 
strong public policy against polygamy,223 both nations have opted for a 
greater degree of equity than has the United States. Because Canada 
and the United Kingdom have facilitated humanitarian-based ingress 
for immigrant women in polygamous unions without endorsing plural 
marriage, their respective approaches provide a compelling case for 
change. 
A. The United Kingdom’s Approach 
The United Kingdom clarified its stance on polygamous 
immigration when it passed the Immigration Act of 1988,224 which 
articulated a firm policy of “prevent[ing] the formation of 
polygamous households”225 by allowing a polygamous husband to 
immigrate with only one of his wives.226 Yet despite adopting a 
seemingly rigid stance against polygamy, the United Kingdom has 
 
 221. See DOROTHY ALLRED SOLOMON, PREDATOR, PREY AND OTHER KINFOLK: 
GROWING UP IN POLYGAMY 13 (2003) (“The secrecy imposed by an illegal lifestyle further 
undermines individual development, increasing the likelihood of abuse and exploitation.”). 
 222. Martha Bailey, Beverley Baines, Bita Amani & Amy Kaufman, Expanding Recognition 
of Foreign Polygamous Marriages: Policy Implications for Canada, in POLYGAMY IN CANADA, 
supra note 19, report 3, at 1, 33. 
 223. See, e.g., Lim v. Lim, [1948] 2 D.L.R. 353, 355 (Can. B.C. S.C.) (“[Polygamous] unions 
are not considered as marriages, though they be called by that name, since such marriages are 
not in conformity with our Christian concept of marriage.”); U.K. BORDER AGENCY, 
IMMIGRATION DIRECTORATES’ INSTRUCTIONS ch. 8, § 1, annex C, § 1 (2009), available at http://
www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/IDIs/idischapter8/section1/
annexc.pdf?view=Binary (“It is Government policy to prevent the formation of polygamous 
households in this country.”). 
 224. Immigration Act, 1988, c. 14 (U.K.). 
 225. U.K. BORDER AGENCY, supra note 223, ch. 8, § 1, annex C, § 1. 
 226. Immigration Act, 1988, § 2. Unlike the law of the United States, which predicates entry 
on the order of marriage, British law is indifferent to chronology, relying instead on “the order 
in which polygamous wives come to the United Kingdom for settlement.” U.K. BORDER 
AGENCY, supra note 223, ch. 8, § 1, annex C, § 1. 
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administered its immigration bar with an eye toward equality. First, if 
a polygamous wife is denied entry, her children will also be denied 
admittance, absent extenuating circumstances.227 This measure 
prevents husbands from unilaterally bifurcating their families and 
instead encourages polygamous men to keep their families intact by 
remaining in their foreign domiciles. Second, Britain’s immigration 
laws feature one loophole that the United States’ laws do not: they 
allow a man who divorces his first wife under English law to sponsor 
his subsequent wives “while continuing to live with [the first wife] as 
his spouse under Islamic law.”228 Third and finally, the law in the 
United Kingdom that prohibits women from immigrating as multiple 
spouses to a single husband “do[es] not apply to wives who have a 
right of entry to the United Kingdom” under employment visas, 
regardless of whether they intend to practice polygamy.229 For women 
who immigrate separately from their polygamous husbands, “English 
law has long regarded parties who were validly, albeit polygamously, 
married elsewhere as being legal spouses in England for the purposes 
of remarriage.”230 Thus, U.K. law entitles immigrant women to 
spousal support, succession rights,231 and state benefits.232 Although 
“[t]he law is drafted thus because the Government have no desire 
forcibly to sever relationships that have been lawfully contracted in 
other jurisdictions,” the English government has reiterated that this 
approach “should not . . . be construed as government approval of 
polygamous marriages.”233 
 
 227. See U.K. BORDER AGENCY, supra note 223, § 6.2 (“It will rarely be appropriate to 
grant [children of a polygamous marriage] entry clearance where their natural mother is still 
alive and still in a position to take care of them. . . . [This] would not apply to a child who has 
the right of abode . . . .”). 
 228. Jonathan Wynne-Jones, Multiple Wives Will Mean Multiple Benefits, SUNDAY 
TELEGRAPH (London), Feb. 3, 2008, at 2. 
 229. U.K. BORDER AGENCY, supra note 223, § 7. 
 230. Joost Blom, Public Policy in Private International Law and Its Evolution in Time, 50 
NETH. INT’L L. REV. 373, 382–83 (2003) (“Protecting the interests of family members is a value 
shared by English and by the foreign law and outweighs whatever anomaly is produced in the 
domestic legal system by recognizing a polygamous union as a marriage.”). 
 231. Id. 
 232. See Sue Reid, Polygamy UK: This Special Mail Investigation Reveals how Thousands of 
Men Are Milking the Benefits System To Support Several Wives, DAILY MAIL (Feb. 25, 2009, 
10:03 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1154789/Polygamy-UK-This-special-Mail-
investigation-reveals-thousands-men-milking-benefits-support-wives.html (“[A] man can 
receive &£92.80 [sic] a week in income support for wife number one, and a further £33.65p [sic] 
for each of his subsequent spouses.”). 
 233. CATHERINE FAIRBAIRN, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, SN/HA/5051, POLYGAMY 5 
(2011), available at http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/briefing-papers/SN
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B. Canada’s Approach 
Like the United Kingdom’s antipolygamy regulations, Canada’s 
immigration laws provide an illuminating counterpoint to the United 
States’ policies.234 Canadian immigration officials use a two-pronged 
test to determine whether a foreign marriage is valid: first, the 
marriage must be formally valid—meaning that it was originally valid 
in the place of celebration—and second, it must be essentially valid—
meaning that each party had the capacity to marry.235 Because 
polygamous marriages celebrated in countries that condone the 
practice would qualify under this test, Canada might theoretically 
recognize such marriages.236 In practice, however, polygamous 
families are presumptively inadmissible237 because they would violate 
Canada’s criminal bigamy laws.238 
Nevertheless, Canada’s polygamy bar is not inflexible. Under the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act,239 which was passed in 2001, 
the minister of immigration can waive an immigrant’s inadmissibility 
to accommodate “humanitarian and compassionate” considerations, 
 
05051.pdf (quoting Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the 
Ministry of Justice). Indeed, the United Kingdom continues to prohibit British residents from 
entering into polygamous marriages either at home or abroad. Id. at 4. 
 234. Canada provides persuasive authority because it employs a system of cooperative 
federalism that mirrors the United States’ own federal design. See Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 
31 Vict., c. 3, § 94 (U.K.) (“[T]he Parliament of Canada may make Provision for the Uniformity 
of all or any of the Laws relative to Property and Civil Rights in Ontario, Nova Scotia, and New 
Brunswick . . . but any Act of the Parliament of Canada making provision for such Uniformity 
shall not have effect in any Province unless and until it is adopted and enacted as Law by the 
Legislature thereof.”). 
 235. Amy J. Kaufman, Polygamous Marriages in Canada, 21 CAN. J. FAM. L. 315, 320 
(2005). 
 236. See Tse v. Canada, [1983] 2 F.C. 308, 311 (Can. Fed. Ct.) (holding that, on the issue of 
whether a polygamous marriage celebrated abroad was valid for immigration purposes, “the 
answer . . . appears to be yes”). 
 237. See Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227, § 125(1)(c)(i) 
(Can.) (explaining that an immigrant is not considered a spouse for immigration purposes if 
“the sponsor or the spouse was, at the time of their marriage, the spouse of another person”). 
 238. See Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 293 (Can.) (“(1) Every one who (a) practises 
or enters into or in any manner agrees or consents to practise or enter into (i) any form of 
polygamy . . . is guilty of an indictable offence . . . .”). Accordingly, in Ali v. Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship & Immigration), (1998), 154 F.T.R. 285 (Can. Fed. Ct.), the court denied a Kuwaiti 
man’s application on behalf of his two wives despite their protestations that they did not plan to 
cohabitate in Canada, id. at 288. In November 2011, British Columbia’s intermediate court 
affirmed the constitutionality of Canada’s polygamy ban. Ian Austen, Canadian Court Rules that 
Polygamy Ban Is Constitutional, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/
24/world/americas/british-columbia-court-upholds-canadas-polygamy-ban.html. 
 239. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 2001, c. 27 (Can.). 
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including “the best interests of a child directly affected” by a parent’s 
inadmissibility.240 Relying on the humanitarian waiver, Ottawa 
officials granted permanent-resident status to polygamist Winston 
Blackmore’s three wives in 1994 so that they could rejoin their 
children in Canada.241 Officials took pains to mitigate any unseemly 
precedent created by their decision, classifying the women as 
“independent applicants under the humanitarian and compassionate 
program,” rather than as members of an illicit “conjugal 
relationship.”242 In addition to adjusting immigration policy with an 
eye toward equity, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act also 
permits polygamous families to enter simultaneously as refugees.243 
Finally, the act enables the minister of immigration to waive the 
polygamy bar so that “some or all of the parties to a polygamous 
marriage might enter Canada as independent immigrants under the 
Investor or Skilled Worker classes.”244 Thus, rather than arming its 
immigration officials with rigid exclusionary formulas, Canada allows 
its officers to advance the equitable principles underlying family 
unification. 
The rights of polygamous couples are administered both by 
Canada’s federal government, which controls marriage and divorce,245 
and by the individual provinces, which oversee marriage 
solemnization.246 Under Canada’s Divorce Act,247 which defines 
“spouse” as “either of two persons who are married to each other,”248 
polygamous spouses are categorically ineligible to divorce. This 
decree codifies the precedent set by Hyde v. Hyde,249 an English case 
in which the court reasoned that “if the compact of a polygamous 
union does not carry with it those duties which it is the office of the 
marriage law in this country to assert and enforce, such unions are not 
within the reach of that law.”250 Consequently, the parties to the 
 
 240. Id. § 25(1). 
 241. Robert Matas, Immigration Bureaucrats Let Man’s Three Wives Stay, TORONTO 
GLOBE & MAIL, Oct. 7, 2002, at A1. 
 242. Id. (quoting Angela Battiston, Immigration Department spokeswoman). 
 243. Id. 
 244. Bala et al., supra note 19, at 34–35. 
 245. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, § 91(26) (U.K.). 
 246. Id. § 92(12). 
 247. Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.3 (2d Supp.) (Can.). 
 248. Id. § 2(1) (emphasis added). 
 249. Hyde v. Hyde, (1866) 1 L.R.P. & D. 130 (Eng.). 
 250. Id. at 137. 
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polygamous marriage were in that case “not entitled to the remedies, 
the adjudication, or the relief of . . . matrimonial law.”251 
Over time, Hyde’s seemingly inflexible precedent has given way 
to a more equitable approach aimed at reducing the tensions between 
public policy and women’s rights. Under Canadian law, polygamous 
immigrants may be entitled to spousal support. In Lim v. Lim252—a 
seminal case for the wives of polygamous immigrants—the second 
wife of a Chinese national, who was domiciled with her husband in 
Canada, petitioned for alimony. Although pursuant to Hyde, the 
court declined to award spousal support, the judge nonetheless 
opined in oft-quoted dicta, 
  It does not seem . . . consistent with common sense that this 
plaintiff who was admitted into this country under our immigration 
laws as the wife of the defendant and who, in China prior to her 
coming to this country, enjoyed the full civil status of wife, should be 
denied that status under our law, when, after a residence here of 
almost 30 years with the defendant as her husband . . . she seeks 
against her husband the remedy which our law provides to a wife to 
claim alimony. . . . The implications arising from [the] refusal to 
recognize the plaintiff’s status for the purpose in question 
are . . . repellant to one’s sense of justice.253 
In the decades following Lim, Canadian courts have shown a 
willingness to afford polygamously married immigrant women the 
benefits of divorce. In In re Hassan,254 a subsequent Ontario case 
concerning a woman in a potentially polygamous marriage,255 the 
court held that the woman was a wife under the relevant Ontario 
statute and was therefore entitled to spousal support.256 
Canadian federal law also recognizes succession rights of 
polygamous spouses domiciled in Canada. In the seriatim opinions 
 
 251. Id. at 138; see also Lim v. Lim, [1948] 2 D.L.R. 353, 355 (Can. B.C. S.C.) (explaining 
that a polygamous marriage “will not be recognized as a valid marriage for the purpose of 
enabling either party to take proceedings against the other to enforce . . . obligations incident to 
a valid marriage contract”). 
 252. Lim v. Lim, [1948] 2 D.L.R. 353 (Can. B.C. S.C.). 
 253. Id. at 357–58. 
 254. In re Hassan, (1976), 69 D.L.R. 3d 224 (Can. Ont. H.C.J.). 
 255. “Potentially polygamous marriages” are marriages that “are actually (de facto) 
monogamous but are celebrated under a law which permits polygamy.” U.K. BORDER AGENCY, 
supra note 223, ch. 8, § 1, annex C, § 5. 
 256. In re Hassan, 69 D.L.R. 3d at 231. 
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announced in Yew v. British Columbia,257 Justice Archer Martin 
supported the majority’s decision to confer succession rights on a 
man’s multiple spouses, remarking on the “unsound” consequences of 
allowing just one wife to recover from her husband’s estate.258 
Warning that such a policy “would lead to unthinkable confusion of 
principles and imperilment of the status and rights” of the women 
involved,259 Justice Martin concluded that the law should recognize a 
polygamous husband’s several marriages for the purposes of 
determining succession.260 
In addition to the protections available to the foreign wives of 
polygamous immigrants under Canadian federal law, several 
Canadian provinces have enacted definitions of marriage that 
recognize the rights of plural wives. In Ontario, for example, a man or 
woman is still considered a spouse even though the marriage is 
“actually . . . polygamous, if [the marriage] was celebrated in a 
jurisdiction whose system of law recognizes [the marriage] as valid.”261 
Spouses of foreign polygamous unions are entitled to a bevy of legal 
rights under Ontario law, including spousal and child support, 
separation agreements, and standing in wrongful-death suits.262 
Polygamous spouses can also “pursue claims for an equalization of 
net family property between the spouses on separation or death.”263 
Indeed, “under the law of Ontario, a spouse who contracted a valid 
polygamous marriage abroad has the same legal rights and 
obligations as a spouse who is party to a traditional monogamous 
marriage.”264 
Canada’s case law and provincial regulations demonstrate a 
commitment to fairness rather than strict exclusion. Recognizing the 
profound injustice that results when women are forcibly estranged 
from their families, Canada has established a system of discretionary 
workarounds and rhetorical distinctions to mitigate the kinds of 
 
 257. Yew v. B.C. (Att’y Gen.), [1924] 1 D.L.R. 1166 (Can. B.C. C.A.). 
 258. Id. at 1180. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. at 1185 (holding that “the two domiciled Chinese wives of the deceased should be 
regarded . . . as his lawful wives for the purposes of the statute under consideration”); accord 
Lim v. Lim, [1948] 2 D.L.R. 353, 357 (Can. B.C. S.C.) (limiting the applicability of Yew’s holding 
to succession rights). 
 261. Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, § 1(2) (Can.). 
 262. JULIEN D. PAYNE & MARILYN A. PAYNE, CANADIAN FAMILY LAW 28 (3d ed. 2008). 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
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harms that the United States’ policies impose on polygamously 
married immigrant women. Furthermore, Canada has endowed the 
wives in such unions with legal rights akin to those of monogamous 
women to prevent legal invisibility. Thus, Canada maintains the de 
jure endorsement of monogamy while establishing a de facto system 
of equity. 
V.  A SOLUTION: EXPANDING THE HUMANITARIAN VISA AND 
APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF PUTATIVE MARRIAGE 
To rectify the harms inflicted upon polygamously married 
immigrant women, the United States should adopt a more equitable 
stance, similar to the approaches taken in Canada and the United 
Kingdom. This stance can be achieved through a two-pronged 
approach. First, immigration officials should be given enhanced 
discretion to waive the polygamy bar in a range of humanitarian 
circumstances. Second, states should use the putative-spouse doctrine 
to accord polygamously married émigrés the anticipated incidents of 
their marriages. Rather than undermine the United States’ 
longstanding antipolygamy policy, this proposed approach would 
strengthen the United States’ commitment to family reunification and 
gender equality without endorsing plural marriage. 
A. Expanding the Humanitarian Visa 
1. Congress, Not the Judiciary, Must Intervene.  Any change to 
the United States’ polygamy bar must begin with Congress. Under 
the plenary-power doctrine, “[t]he right of a nation to expel or deport 
foreigners . . . is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit 
and prevent their entrance into the country.”265 The Supreme Court 
has long held that Congress has unfettered authority to regulate “the 
admission of aliens”266 and, further, that any congressional articulation 
of immigration policy is “conclusive upon the judiciary.”267 
Considering its unilateral and largely unchecked power to formulate 
immigration policy, Congress should revise the existing polygamy bar 
because, in addition to disadvantaging foreign women,268 the bar also 
 
 265. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893). 
 266. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977). 
 267. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889). 
 268. See supra Part III. 
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contravenes Congress’s abiding interest in family reunification.269 To 
accomplish this change, Congress should consider broadening 
immigration law’s definition of family by replacing the traditional 
nuclear ideal with a more flexible understanding. This would enable 
officials to recognize polygamous unions for the limited purpose of 
conferring residency, without undermining the strong public policy 
against plural marriage. 
The United States’ immigration laws reflect a preference for the 
traditional nuclear family.270 This ideal, however, is no longer the 
dominant reality, as “many households do not fit [the nuclear family] 
mold.”271 Today, an estimated “[t]wenty-eight million children in the 
United States grow up in families in which care is not provided 
exclusively by two heterosexual parents.”272 In light of this trend, the 
Supreme Court has eschewed a rigid definition of family, opining that 
“[o]urs is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds 
uniting the members of the nuclear [household].”273 
The Court has long conferred constitutional protections on “the 
most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, 
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy,” including 
decisions regarding marriage and procreation.274 Courts have faced 
the question of how far individuals’ intimate liberties should extend 
and, furthermore, how the bounds of autonomy might alter the 
traditional concept of family. In response to these burgeoning 
questions of personhood, the Court, in Lawrence v. Texas,275 pushed 
the bounds of intimate autonomy past established cultural norms. 
Reasoning that “the right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, 
consensual conduct” is a right “that has been accepted as an integral 
part of human freedom in many other countries,” the Court 
concluded that homosexual intercourse is a liberty interest protected 
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.276 In a 
vehement dissent, Justice Scalia warned that the majority’s reasoning 
 
 269. See supra Part III. 
 270. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1879) (upholding the Morrill Anti-
Bigamy Act’s prohibition of polygamy); supra Part III.A. 
 271. Demleitner, supra note 158, at 290. 
 272. Matthew M. Kavanagh, Rewriting the Legal Family: Beyond Exclusivity to a Care-
Based Standard, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 83, 91 (2004). 
 273. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977). 
 274. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
 275. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 276. Id. at 577. 
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eliminated any principled argument that a similar tolerance for 
polygamous marriage is not constitutionally required.277 
Despite some scholars’ beliefs to the contrary,278 it is unlikely that 
Congress will reverse its stance on the validity of polygamous 
marriages under immigration law. Rather, for polygamous families to 
obtain federal recognition, they will have to be recognized through 
functional means. A limited number of state courts have chosen to 
honor relationships that, although not familial in a legal sense, are 
nonetheless characterized by the “emotional and financial 
commitment and interdependence” underpinning the concept of 
family.279 Indeed, in countries that condone its practice, polygamy 
provides the complex emotional and fiscal attachments that are 
central to this functional definition of family.280 As the following 
Subsections discuss in greater detail, if Congress were to adopt a 
functional understanding of family for the purposes of polygamous 
immigration, it could adhere to its family-centric ethos without 
legalizing polygamy. 
2. Proposed Changes to the Humanitarian Visas.  To mitigate the 
immigration bar’s harmful effects on the wives of polygamous 
immigrants, the United States should allow immigration officials to 
exercise greater discretion when granting humanitarian visas to 
 
 277. Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 278. Since Lawrence, commentators have debated whether polygamy will be legalized. See 
generally Joseph J. Bozzuti, Note, The Constitutionality of Polygamy Prohibitions After 
Lawrence v. Texas: Is Scalia a Punchline or a Prophet?, 43 CATH. LAW. 409, 413 (2004) 
(concluding that although “polygamy statutes need not be overturned[,] . . . . Lawrence . . . may 
very well have left all morals-based legislation vulnerable to constitutional attack”); Samantha 
Slark, Note, Are Anti-Polygamy Laws an Unconstitutional Infringement on the Liberty Interests 
of Consenting Adults?, 6 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 451, 458 (2004) (“In light of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Lawrence, it is no longer legitimate to prohibit the practice of polygamy 
merely because there is a long history of criminalization of the practice or because a majority of 
society still deems it immoral.”). 
 279. See Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 54 (N.Y. 1989) (eschewing a strict legal 
definition of family because “a more realistic, and certainly equally valid, view of a family 
includes two adult lifetime partners whose relationship is long term and characterized by an 
emotional and financial commitment and interdependence”). But see Preferred Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Pine, 848 N.Y.S.2d 190, 194 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (declining to extend the “expansive” 
definition of family in Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989)). 
 280. See Angela Campbell, How Have Policy Approaches to Polygamy Responded to 
Women’s Experiences and Rights? An International, Comparative Analysis, in POLYGAMY IN 
CANADA, supra note 19, report 1, at 10 (“Many women living in polygamy have supported 
plural marriage and appear to find happiness and satisfaction within their family structures. 
Certain anecdotes reveal genuine love and companionship among polygamous spouses and 
within their entire family unit.”). 
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polygamous families. The proposed initiative should begin with a 
revision of VAWA, which, as previously discussed, excludes women 
in polygamous marriages from the category of battered spouses who 
can obtain relief from their abusive marriages.281 Congress should first 
remove polygamy from VAWA’s calculus of “good moral character” 
when a foreign petitioner can prove that her polygamous marriage 
was valid under the laws of the country where the marriage was 
solemnized.282 Because, in their countries of origin, validly married 
women have entered into legally and socially cognizable unions with 
their polygamous husbands, categorically precluding them from 
establishing good moral character is arbitrary and inhumane. 
Furthermore, this de facto condemnation vitiates VAWA’s primary 
purpose: empowering women to leave their toxic marriages. Revising 
the requirements for good moral character would thus restore 
VAWA’s humanitarian purpose without compromising public policy. 
In addition to removing polygamy from VAWA’s calculus of 
good moral character, lawmakers should enable polygamously 
married women to reunite with their immigrant children.283 The 
United States could mitigate the harmful effects of its policy on the 
family by adopting the United Kingdom’s approach of refusing 
admission to a woman’s children if she is denied entry.284 Such a 
solution, however, would run afoul of the United States’ family-
centric immigration system because it would bifurcate child custody.285 
A better tactic would thus be to adopt Canada’s solution of allowing 
subsequent wives to rejoin their children as independent petitioners.286 
Although this approach could be pursued by crafting a new 
humanitarian visa, it could also be accomplished by allowing officials 
to waive the polygamy bar for women petitioning under employment-
based visas.287 
 
 281. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 282. Smearman, supra note 36, at 446. 
 283. See supra Part III.C. 
 284. Bala et al., supra note 19, at 24. 
 285. See supra Part III.A. 
 286. See Matas, supra note 241 (noting that William Blackmore’s polygamous wives 
obtained entry “as independent applicants under the humanitarian and compassionate 
program”). 
 287. See supra note 244 and accompanying text. The benefit of this approach is that 
qualifying applicants would theoretically be fiscally self-sufficient and therefore less likely to 
claim public assistance. 
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An interest in family reunification would also justify expanding 
the definition of derivative beneficiaries to include refugees and 
asylum seekers. Under existing laws, which preclude foreign women 
from petitioning as spouses in connection with their polygamous 
husbands’ refugee or asylum visas, inadmissible wives face potentially 
fatal consequences.288 To remedy this harm, the United States should 
follow Canada’s example by enabling polygamously married women 
to petition as derivative beneficiaries of their children’s visas.289 This 
approach would recognize the humanitarian tenor of women’s 
resettlement without endorsing plural marriage. Alternatively, if 
there are no children within the polygamous marriage, Congress 
could craft a new subset of immediate-relative derivative visas 
premised on a functional definition of family.290 Indeed, the current 
policies, which allow immigration officials to disregard polygamy in 
adjustment-of-status proceedings, support the notion that Congress 
did not intend for polygamy to impede humanitarian resettlement.291 
Together, these changes to humanitarian visas would mitigate 
the polygamy bar’s harmful effects on foreign women and would 
bolster the United States’ commitment to family reunification. 
B. Applying the Doctrine of Putative Spouses to Foreign Plural Wives 
Once immigrants are inside the United States, their status is no 
longer governed by the plenary-power doctrine. Immigrants’ rights at 
that stage are instead administered by the tradition of Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins,292 under which “aliens are ‘persons’ for purposes of 
[constitutional] protection.”293 Although the United States has thus far 
eschewed a constitutional right to polygamous marriage,294 the 
Supreme Court has nonetheless recognized a liberty interest in the 
“emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily 
 
 288. See supra Part III. 
 289. See supra Part IV. 
 290. See supra Part V.A.1. 
 291. See supra Part III. 
 292. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
 293. Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference That Alienage Makes, 69 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1060 (1994) (quoting Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369). The Yick Wo tradition 
has resulted in a variety of constitutional protections for aliens, including protections under the 
Ninth, Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments in criminal proceedings, as well as certain First 
Amendment rights. Id. at 1060–61. 
 294. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 16566 (1879) (holding that the Morrill Anti-
Bigamy Act’s prohibition on polygamy does not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment). 
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association.”295 This interest in protecting familial bonds has led many 
states “to provide the rights of relationship to non-traditional family 
members, even while [they continue to resist] the expansion of 
traditional notions of family status.”296 Many state courts, finding an 
affirmative duty to invest nontraditional families with legal rights, 
have encouraged legislatures to adopt laws that protect, for example, 
same-sex relationships.297 The American Law Institute likewise 
advocates giving parties whose relationships are not legally 
cognizable the opportunity to receive the incidents of marriage, 
including property division and compensatory payments upon 
dissolution.298 Thus, given that legal immigrants are entitled to the 
benefits and protections of U.S. law, and given that state legislatures 
have trended toward recognizing nontraditional relationships, states 
should use the putative-spouse doctrine to provide foreign plural 
wives the incidents of marriage. 
The putative-spouse doctrine is the best avenue for providing 
immigrant women in polygamous marriages with the incidents of 
their unions. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA)299 
defines a putative spouse as “[a]ny person who has cohabited with 
another to whom he is not legally married in the good faith belief that 
he was married to that person.”300 Although the doctrine of putative 
spouses is typically used to compensate the innocent spouse in a 
bigamous union, it could also apply to foreign women who possessed 
the good-faith belief that their state-sanctioned polygamous 
marriages were legal at the time they were contracted.301 Expanding 
the doctrine to foreign polygamous marriage would entitle 
 
 295. Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977). 
 296. Katharine K. Baker, Marriage and Parenthood as Status and Rights: The Growing, 
Problematic and Possibly Constitutional Trend To Disaggregate Family Status from Family 
Rights, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 127, 177 (2010). 
 297. See, e.g., Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999) (extending the benefits of 
marriage to same-sex couples). 
 298. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION §§ 6.01–.06 (2000). 
 299. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT (1974). 
 300. Id. § 209. The UMDA has not been accepted by all fifty states, but a number of states 
recognize putative spouses. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 2251 (West 2004) (recognizing a 
putative marriage in which “either party or both parties believed in good faith that the marriage 
was valid”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.055 (West 2006) (“Any person who has cohabited with 
another to whom the person is not legally married in the good faith belief that the person was 
married to the other is a putative spouse until knowledge of the fact that the person is not 
legally married terminates the status . . . .”). 
 301. See supra Part I. 
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subsequent wives to a range of possible benefits, including alimony,302 
property division,303 succession rights,304 the ability to sue for a 
decedent spouse’s wrongful death,305 and the right to receive public 
retirement benefits through a surviving spouse.306 This approach 
would have two advantages. First, it would give foreign women the 
benefits of monogamy while nullifying an otherwise-repugnant union. 
Second, because it would apply only to “good faith” marriages, 
adapting the doctrine to foreign polygamous unions would not 
exonerate U.S. domiciliaries from purposeful bigamy. 
C. Welfare Challenges to this Proposed Solution 
Although this two-pronged solution would vindicate the rights of 
foreign women in polygamous marriages, the correlative increase in 
eligible immigrants could burden the welfare system. Under INA 
§ 212(a)(4), an immigrant who “is likely at any time to become a 
public charge” is ineligible for either admission or adjustment of 
status.307 The public-charge bar, however, is inapplicable to refugees 
and asylees seeking either admission308 or adjustment of status.309 As a 
consequence, admitting polygamously married women as derivative 
beneficiaries to a principal’s refugee or asylum petition would create 
the greatest probability of fiscal strain. Refugees and asylum seekers 
are entitled to a bevy of government welfare benefits,310 including 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Social Security, 
 
 302. See Kindle v. Kindle, 629 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (awarding 
permanent alimony to the putative spouse). 
 303. See, e.g., Hager v. Hager, 553 P.2d 919, 924 (Alaska 1976) (awarding a putative wife 
approximately 8 percent of her husband’s property); Williams v. Williams, 97 P.3d 1124, 1129–30 
(Nev. 2004) (upholding a property division between putative spouses). 
 304. See, e.g., Estate of Leslie, 689 P.2d 133, 140 (Cal. 1984) (“[A] surviving putative spouse 
is entitled to succeed to a share of his or her decedent’s separate property.”). 
 305. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 377.60(b) (West Supp. 2011) (establishing that a 
putative spouse has standing to sue for a decedent spouse’s wrongful death). 
 306. Frank S. Berall, The Non-Traditional Family in the United States and Canada—Estate 
and Tax Planning Responses, in FAMILIES AND ESTATES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 9, 13 
(Rosalind F. Croucher ed., 2005). 
 307. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 212(a)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(A) 
(2006). 
 308. INA § 207(c)(3), 8 U.S.C.§ 1157(c)(3). 
 309. Id. § 209(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c). 
 310. Refugees have a “relatively high participation rate” in federal welfare programs 
because they “are eligible for assistance upon arriving . . . and are encouraged by refugee-
integrating programs to seek it.” Paul Meehan, Combatting Restrictions on Immigrant Access to 
Public Benefits: A Human Rights Perspective, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 389, 394 n.22 (1997). 
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and Supplemental Social Security (SSI).311 Because Social Security 
benefits accrue upon retirement312 and because SSI benefits are 
specific to elderly and disabled workers,313 this Section focuses on 
alleviating potential burdens on the TANF program. 
As a general matter, because refugees “flee their homes with 
little more than the clothes on their backs,” they are more likely than 
any other class of immigrants to receive federal TANF assistance.314 
The TANF program is designed to “provide assistance to needy 
families” while “promoting job preparation, work and marriage.”315 
Under the TANF program, states receive a block federal grant to 
distribute to qualified families in the form of “cash, payments, 
vouchers and other . . . benefits designed to meet a family’s ongoing 
basic needs.”316 Although states can articulate their own guidelines for 
TANF eligibility, the federal government restricts TANF assistance 
to households in which adult family members “participate 
in . . . allowable work activities for specified hours each week.”317 In 
addition to the strict work requirement, families are limited to sixty 
months of TANF assistance.318 
The TANF program has the potential to be abused if the wives 
of polygamous immigrants living in polygamous households claim 
TANF benefits as single parents. Such welfare fraud is rampant 
among Mormon fundamentalist communities in which fundamentalist 
men “spiritually marry” multiples wives so that “in the eyes of the 
 
 311. 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(A) (2006); Marcia Henry, Immigrants’ Eligibility for Federal 
Benefits, 38 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 393, 395–97 (2004). 
 312. 20 C.F.R. § 404.110 (2011). Numerous solutions have been proposed to prevent 
excessive social-security payouts to polygamous wives. One approach would be to preclude 
subsequent wives from receiving payments altogether. The 1968 U.K. Law Commission, 
however, suggested that social-security benefits could be payable to each of a man’s polygamous 
wives in full, provided that the husband made an increased tax contribution. Bailey et al., supra 
note 222, at 13. Alternatively, it suggested that “social security benefits that would have been 
payable to one wife should be equally divided between all of the wives of a polygamous 
marriage.” Id. (quoting U.K. LAW COMM’N, PUBLISHED WORKING PAPER NO. 21, 
POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES 50 (1968)). 
 313. 20 C.F.R. § 416.202. 
 314. Bill Ong Hing, Don’t Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor: Conflicted Immigrant Stories 
and Welfare Reform, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 174 (1998). 
 315. 45 C.F.R. § 260.20(a)–(b) (2011). 
 316. 45 C.F.R. § 260.31(a)(1). 
 317. TANF Fact Sheet, ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/opa/
fact_sheets/tanf_factsheet.pdf (last updated Apr. 2009). 
 318. See 45 C.F.R. § 260.59 (imposing penalties for states that exceed the federal five-year 
limit). 
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state, the subsequent wives all remain single mothers eligible for 
welfare and other forms of public assistance.”319 To curtail this type of 
abuse, the United Kingdom has implemented a system whereby 
spouses in a polygamous union receive a prorated share of family 
benefits. Under this revised program, “a man can receive £92.80 a 
week in income support for wife number one, and a further £33.65p 
[sic] for each of his subsequent spouses.”320 Because the United 
Kingdom’s “benefit is payable at the difference between the couple 
rate and the higher rate for a single person . . . there is no financial 
advantage to claiming for those in a polygamous marriage.”321 
Although a prorated-benefits system would likely ease the fiscal 
strain on welfare programs such as TANF, it is not without its 
problems. Because such a payment structure implicitly recognizes and 
endorses polygamous unions, the United Kingdom’s approach would 
need to be tweaked slightly. As a practical matter, it is unlikely that 
polygamous refugees or asylum seekers would immediately abandon 
their polygamous lifestyles. Instead, there would probably be a period 
in which polygamous families still resided together. TANF assistance 
should account for this reality by providing foreign polygamous 
families with prorated benefits for a limited period of time. In 
keeping with TANF’s rigid accountability measures, a husband’s 
multiple wives would have to demonstrate that they are both 
physically independent and engaged in an eligible work program to 
receive single-person TANF benefits at the end of the appointed time 
frame. In addition to limiting the strain on federal welfare, this 
approach would integrate polygamous immigrants into the national 
economy. 
Even if polygamous refugees and asylum seekers pose an initial 
threat of fiscal strain,322 scholarship suggests that “[o]verall, 
immigrants represent a net fiscal plus.”323 In a 1994 study, researchers 
estimated that “immigrants arriving after 1970 pay taxes of seventy 
 
 319. Alyssa Rower, The Legality of Polygamy: Using the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 38 FAM. L.Q. 711, 717 (2004). In Colorado City, Utah, which boasts a 
significant Mormon fundamentalist population, “[33] percent of the town’s residents receive 
food stamps, which is shockingly high compared to the state average of 4.7 percent.” Id. 
 320. Reid, supra note 232. 
 321. FAIRBAIRN, supra note 233, at 8. 
 322. Indeed, the federal government assumes that immigrants will create a fiscal deficit. See 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 § 402, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1612 (2006) (restricting immigrants’ access to public assistance). 
 323. Jeffrey S. Passel & Michael Fix, United States Immigration in a Global Context: Past, 
Present, and Future, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 5, 14 (1994). 
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billion dollars to all levels of government—a net surplus of twenty 
five to thirty billion dollars more than they use in public services.”324 
Although evidence indicates that refugees are the largest immigrant 
consumers of public assistance,325 “statistics for the second generation 
of refugees specifically demonstrate that refugee welfare use is 
transitional rather than permanent.”326 Because refugee assistance has 
not been shown to create a “cycle of dependency,”327 polygamous 
immigrants may ultimately produce net fiscal gains in the United 
States. 
CONCLUSION 
The antipolygamy movement, which began as the clarion call of 
women’s suffrage, has led, paradoxically, to the development of an 
immigration system that curtails women’s rights. By mapping 
American values onto marriages that were consented to without 
DOMA in mind, the United States is endorsing a form of invidious 
gender discrimination. To rectify this harm, the United States should 
look to the examples of its peer nations, which, in recent years, have 
embraced the principle of equality in dealing with polygamous 
immigrants. To keep pace with its peer nations, the United States 
should adopt the two-pronged approach of, first, expanding the 
categories of permissible humanitarian immigrants and, second, using 
the putative-spouse doctrine to vindicate plural wives’ expectations. 
Together, these measures would reconcile the tensions inherent in the 
United States’ protracted battled against polygamy by both 
emancipating women from an “odious”328 marital institution and 
ameliorating the law’s discriminatory effects. 
 
 324. Id. See generally JULIAN L. SIMON, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION 
(1989) (arguing that immigrants create a net financial benefit). But see generally DONALD 
HUDDLE, CARRYING CAPACITY NETWORK, THE NET COSTS OF IMMIGRATION: THE FACTS, 
THE TRENDS, AND THE CRITICS, at i (1996) (concluding that, during the 1990s, immigrants 
yielded a $65.01 billion net deficit). 
 325. See Hing, supra note 314, at 173 (arguing that, outside of the refugee context, “use of 
all public programs . . . by immigrants does not impose any unusual fiscal burden”). 
 326. Id. at 174. 
 327. Id. 
 328. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879). 
